THIS IS THE HOUSE BUILT BY...:

RECLAIMING THE CONCEPTS OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY FROM THE NARRATIVES OF MIGRATION AND RELIGIOUS RADICALISATION

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EU	European Union
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ICT	Information Communication Technologies
KTPK	Public Broadcasting Channel
ICG	International Crisis Grou
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
UN	United Nations
PIL	Research Company (Pikir Izildoo Laboratoriyasy Ltd)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Numerous migration studies consider the influence of inter-state labour migration on family structures, their adaptation to and their integration in host countries. These studies testify to an increasing importance of migration with family members or other relatives; a tendency of family and kinship ties to strengthen in host countries; and a mitigating influence of family on managing stress arising from their migration experience.

In its work on migration and the protection of the labour migrants' rights for almost 70 years, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has encountered many times how families affect labour migrant's motivations and strategies for adaptation in host countries and their re-integration upon their return to their homeland. At the same time, it is evident that migration processes themselves affect the transformation of families and, subsequently, of local communities.

The current applied research focuses on the transformation of families and local communities in the context of migration. Its purpose is to assist in the development of more targeted and audience-specific information and media resources on labour migrants' rights and to counter radicalisation and involvement in violent ideologies of labour migrants and their families.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Qualitative participant observation

This tool was applied in the pilot villages to obtain in-depth data. A semiformal participant observation involved PIL researchers immersing themselves in the very environment they studied to learn about practices of people's everyday lives.

During such observations, PIL researchers analysed families' external and internal social relationships.

The research sample consisted of the following eight settlements across Kyrgyzstan:

- village Ogut in Naryn Oblast
- village Ak-Terek in Issyk-Kul Oblast
- village Sosnovka in Chui Oblast
- village Kalmak-Ashuu in Chui Oblast
- village Kashgar-Kyshtak in Osh Oblast
- village Aravan in Osh Oblast
- town Kyzyl-Kiya in Batken Oblast
- township Shamaldy-Sai in Jalal-Abad Oblast

As agreed with the client, the research sample represented as many different types of settlements as possible, including where:

- there had been conflicts due to religious or ethnic differences;
- most residents had been affected by migration;
- residents rarely resorted to migration as a livelihood strategy;
- population was predominantly polycultural;
- population was predominantly monocultural;
- settlements were most frequently mentioned by media outlets in the preceding year, in connection with various risks and current developments.

We used cases studies as part of a qualitative research strategy to illustrate patterns and examples of situational development. However, these cases studies did not allow for a countrywide generalisation.

In each settlement, fieldworkers randomly selected two households where a family member was either working abroad at the time of research or used to in the preceding five years. The selected households had different backgrounds (social status, ethnicity, faith, age, and gender of migrant family members). Fieldworkers spent 12 days with each of the two selected households.

During their stay, fieldworkers collected data on different aspects of family members' relationships. They used a sociometric technique by Jacob Moreno that interrogates typology of social behaviours within the families on a day to day basis and reveals the following:

- degrees of family cohesion-fragmentation;
- 'sociometric position' of family members in terms of attraction-repulsion and closeness - remoteness of relationships;
- interfamily subsystems, cohesive groups who may have informal leaders;
- communication links and the nature of communications between family members.

All family members were asked to fill in a sociometric questionnaire. First, family members listed people that were practically involved and how often (always, often, rarely) in a respondent's specific social activities: exchanging concerns and secrets; seeking advice; doing household chores together; resting; sharing news; turning for help; and shopping. Second, respondent wrote list people with whom they would prefer to conduct such activities.

The derived data was visualised through the sociograms on family relationships which reflected emotional preferences (a system of mutual or one-sided attraction or repulsion), presence of sociometric 'stars' (selected by most respondents) and 'pariahs (avoided by everyone) in the family[1].

Sociograms on communication links reflected answers to the questions 'With whom do you share your concerns and secrets?' and 'With whom do you usually share news?'

In 16 selected families, all members filled in the sociometric questionnaires. After processing the initial results, the data on 15 families were included in the analysis of interpersonal relationships which generated sociograms of family relationships and sociograms of communicational links for every family.

Focus group discussions

PIL used focus group discussions to obtain in-depth information on:

- how decisions are made about a relative's migration;
- how migration affects individual families and society at large;
- perceptions and mindsets on the issue of radicalisation in the country and local communities;
- perceptions and mindsets about factors which facilitate and prevent radicalisation.

Focus group discussions were held with residents of the eight pilot settlements. In total PIL researchers conducted 32 focus groups discussions, four in each settlement, separately for each of the four groups:

- young women (28 years old and younger)
- young men (28 years old and younger)
- older women (35 years old and older)
- older men (35 years old men and older).

The total number of participants of the groups was 324.

1. https://psychology.academic.ru/2424/социограмма

Diagram 1. *Social and demographic characteristics of respondents.*



The average number of participants in female groups was 10. As for male groups, recruiting young men was difficult in many settlements for the following two reasons: a) many had migrated for work and were absent; and b) they often declined the invitation to discuss the proposed issues. As a result, participants in young men's groups averaged 9 and in older men's groups - 10.

Diagram 1 shows an insignificant average age difference between male and female groups participants: young men groups - 27; young women - 26; older men - 49; older women - 48.

Marital status among younger groups varied more noticeably: 84% of young women were married compared with only 50% of young men. Among the older participants, 84% of women were married, which was nine per cent less than for the older men.

Two thirds of young women and one quarter of young men were unemployed. The share of unemployed older women was two times less (34%) than among the young women but three times higher than the percentage of unemployed older men (11%).

Larger shares of young and older men worked in agriculture, 27% and 35% respectively. Of men engaged in business, including as private entrepreneurs or individual entrepreneurs, 22% were young men and 19% older men. The share of private entrepreneurship, individual entrepreneurship and business among young women was 2%, older women

- 4%. The percentage of women working in agriculture was 4% among young women and 12% among older women. 16% of young women and 26 % of older women had permanent jobs.

In terms of financial wealth indicators, young men and older women were the worst off. 41% of young men and 40% of older women said they lack sufficient means to buy food and clothes. The percentage of young women in the same position was 23% and of older men - 17%.

The rate of completed secondary education was the same for young men and women - 50%. It was different for the older population: women - 49% and men - 65%. More than one third of women of both age groups had completed tertiary education. Only 25 % of young men and 10% of older men received higher education.

As mentioned before, the participants were recruited for focus groups discussions based on their migration experience, among other criteria. However, in some settlements (especially nos. 3 and 4) both the young and the older women did not usually undertake migration, except for divorcees and widows who were mostly young and were not likely to return home. PIL adjusted to this situation by including women who had migrant relatives.

Most of the participants with experience of migration had less than a year experience: 45% of young men; 36% of young women; 32% of older women; 41% of older men.

Respondents with 1 to 2 years of migration experience were 34% of young men and 21% of young women, 24% older women and 28% older men.

People with the most extensive experience of 5 years and over, included 13% of older men and 16% of older women.

In 2019, it was mainly young and older men who actively considered migration, respectively 57% and 49%. Among women, those considering leaving was 24% of young women and 22% of older women.

All respondents were selected by the method of convenience with the assistance of local community activists. During the recruitment, PIL informed potential respondents about the research. PIL field workers contacted only people who had given informed consent to participate in the study.

Each participant was approached in person or by phone one day before a focus group discussion. Group moderators discussed with the participants the questions of voluntary participation, confidentiality of the obtained data, ethical standards of the data usage, and publication of the report.

Secondary data analysis

In addition to the above-listed primary data, PIL investigated secondary data on popular perceptions of radicalisation and its factors and, particularly, the following:

- Quantitative data from the study, ***Determination of the level of knowledge among women and youth about the radicalisation and violent extremism.*** PIL conducted the research for the Women's Progressive Social Union 'Mutakalim' as part of their project on countering women's radicalism in Jalad-Abad and Chui oblasts, supported by EU-Hedayah;
- qualitative and quantitative data from the study, Gender in Society Perceptions, funded by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund and implemented through a joint programme of UN Women, UNFPA and IOM called 'Evidence-based approach to facilitate responsive gender policy and programmes for equality and lasting peace in Kyrgyzstan' in partnership with the Kyrgyz Ministry for Labour and Social Development and the Kyrgyz National Statistics Committee;
- quantitative data from the PIL survey on religiousness and civic participation[2].

2. G amza D. and Jones P., Religious Regulation and Political Mobilization in Kyrgyzstan Dataset, June 2019.

CHAPTER 1.
COMMUNITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

Five years ago, when analysing economic developments of local job markets and unemployment across Kyrgyzstan, PIL discovered that each oblast (region) and within them, each village and town, had different market processes and their economies had been developing unevenly[3]. Kyrgyzstan's Migration Profile 2015-2018 confirmed the existence of 'significant territorial differences that affected levels of poverty reduction' and differences in trends in changes of average wages by region[4]. Researchers tasked with developing the concept of uneven development or economic geography justified the need to move from a methodological approach of 'globalisation' to 'localisation'.

The current study also found that each of the studied locations had a unique configuration of social, cultural, and economic factors that gave rise to specific community development modes and different migration trends. At the same time, despite a variety of forms and elements, we could find common components at the very core of any community (institutional core)[5]:

- **System of production and interpretation of codes of meanings,** emerging in communication processes (discursive[6] component);
- **System of production of normative order, asserting specific behaviours and interactions in a community** (legitimisation or rationalizing component);
- **System of relationships of autonomy-dependency based on the resources of the authority to manage people and the ability to manage material objects** (power component or domination component).

In order to examine the nature of changes in the studied communities in the context of migration, this chapter will examine the dynamic processes in **systems of power and dominance** (especially when it comes to the interaction of different social groups and processes of resource distribution and management), **legitimisation** (especially in terms of emerging or already normalized behaviours and interactions of citizens within the communities), and **discourse** (forms and types of meanings and their interpretations emerging in communication processes).

3. Expanded Migration Profile 2010-2015.

http://www.nisi.kg/images/publikacii/08_%d0%bc%d0%b8%d0%b3%d1%80%d0%b0%d1%86%d0%b8%d0%be%d0%bd%d0%bd%d1%8b%d0%b9%20%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be%d1%84%d0%b8%d0%bb%d1%8c.pdf pp 92-93 (Internal labour migration)

4. Expanded Migration Profile 2015-2018 http://www.nisi.kg/images/publikacii/Migration%20Profile%202018%20in%20Russian.pdf p 79 (Migration and economic situation), p91 (structure of incoming foreign investment by region), p91 (structure of incoming foreign investment by region), p97 (income differences).

5. ypology is based on the Giddens' concept from, Structural Elements of Social Systems, see details in: ecsocman.hse.ru/data/882/870/1231/004.KERIMOV.pdf

6. Giddens calls this as Signifier Component.

1.1. Meanings and interpretation of migration strategies

After analysing the issues raised by the respondents during interviews or conversations, we identified three themes that grouped diverse communications within the studied communities: discourse on migration and how it affects families, society and the state; discussion about the role of religion and people's religiosity in the development of families, society and the state; and, lastly, discourse on crime, the role criminal gangs play in the development of families, society and the nation.

1.1.1. Discourse about migration and its effects

In most of focus group discussions, respondents conceptualised migration and migration strategies of local population as a last resort in the absence of alternatives. It was something one was forced to do due to financial debts; the complete lack of means for living; need to have one's own housing or to improve living conditions; expenses of life rituals - weddings and ceremonies of matchmaking, a commemoration of one's deceased parents, etc. During the observations inside the households, most of those who had worked abroad explained their strategies as a financial necessity. Other motivations and reasons included a desire to 'see the world', 'to pass the initiation and grow up'[7] and even a case where a family sent the male head of the household into migration to stop his philandering in a village. Some respondents recognised that migration could be used as a saving strategy to avoid spending money on social occasions. According to U6 from a young men group in settlement no.6: *'It happens. Relatives suggest staying home and work here. But we won't make much by working here. It is more profitable to work abroad, as salaries are higher by dozens of thousands. We can work here; there are employment opportunities. But if you work here, you spend it. There are daily expenses, Kyrgyz people hold ritual celebrations all the time. Abroad, everything is stable; you earn money and send it home. It will be embarrassing to return empty-handed. In short, it is easier to motivate yourself when abroad.' According to a young woman from Settlement 5 (U5): 'The wage differences are small. But staying in the home villages leads to more expenditures. When you abroad, you have only one aim: work – rest-work. When working abroad, migrants rarely go to events; hence, they save more money, I think'.*

The perception of a migration strategy as an unavoidable result of the absence of other alternatives by most migrants explains the prevalence of negative assessments of the impact of migration on the life of their communities. Focus group participants in all locations listed migration risks and negative consequence. We grouped them as follows:

7. For details on the diversity of motivations see Chapter 1.

Reduction in material opportunities/ status of families and people
Migrants become homeless
Migrant's family loses benefits home
Women's workload increases
Degradation of family and public morals
Joining criminal gangs, mafia
Public morals getting worse
Families break down
Children become spoiled without parental supervision; children are deprived of affection
Migrant youth get used to big money and their world outlook changes – they become materialistic, change attitude towards parents and forget traditions
Children whose parents migrated lose their Kyrgyz cultural roots, become Russified
Migrants lose their faith, start eating pork, drinking vodka and smoking
Threats to civic life
Child abuse is on the increase
Migrants return carrying contagious diseases
Migrants' health deteriorates
Dying abroad
Children of migrants die in Kyrgyzstan
Environment is damaged by so many cars purchased, harm to health of those who live in here
Risks to the nation
Kyrgyz language gets forgotten, lost
Youth drop out of school
Citizens do not return
Women marry foreigners
Brain drain
Harm to civil rights
Migrants are denied voting rights

The above table shows that many negative perceptions of migration concerned family and public morals. At the same time, the respondents perceived the material deterioration as a result that was not typical to migration or that was neutralised by it.

In listing migration's positive effects on the life of communities, the most popular answer was material development of society and the state. It is worth noting that criteria for significant contribution of migration were based on the developmental logic: building houses, repairing roads were signs of modernisation and evident development. Respondents did not investigate who benefited or lost from this development and in what way because they believed that the development of infrastructure and growth of material wealth were an absolute and unmistakable plus.

Material development of the state/ society
Houses are being built at home
Roads are being repaired
Houses are improved (sanitary conditions, mechanisation of domestic labour)
People's lives are improving
State budget benefits from interest from transfers, banks get profit
Sports facilities are being built (due to charity of successful migrants)
High-rise buildings are being built (thanks to migrant buyers)
Remittances help develops the state - even when buying building materials for houses, country profits
Improving public morals
More people become believers
More people read namaz in Russia
Mosques are being built
More donations to society
Improving citizen's lives
People are in a good mood
Learning new languages
Expanding worldviews
Getting new occupational skills

In a different focus group exercise, respondents were asked to draw and describe an image of a successful and unsuccessful villager returning from migration with material assets. However, in Settlement.4, the image of a successful villager was very different: a middle-aged man, a senior in a family of well-known business entrepreneurs (Figure 1). Such image recognised the fact that his family had already been well off before even Soviet times. First, they were related to local rulers ('manaps') then to the Communist party elite; their wealth continued to grow from generation to generation. This categorisation was justified by an older group respondent (U1) as follows: *'They never needed anything. Even during the 1916 uprising, they lived very well, were rich. Even when everyone was in need, his parents lived well. They helped a lot of people. Then the children became businessmen…'. When the group moderator asked 'So, according to your drawing, to be successful, one needs to come from a good family?', the reply was 'Yes. They will be well provided for. They would not need to migrate.' Interestingly, the image of this man was presented mainly through material possessions – grain fields, tractors and cars, herds of cattle, a two-storey house…*

In all other cases, respondents linked success models with migration. Drawings often depicted women returning home from migration with the attributes of 'success': expensive mobile phones, non-traditional, 'Western' clothing, suitcases full of gifts and money. (Figures 2 and 3)



Still, respondents admitted that monetary wealth was hidden from the society as successful migrant workers did not carry cash around. Instead, they kept them 'in the banks'.

One respondent noted that for girls who did not get married 'on time', migration could lead to a very successful outcome - finding a partner abroad and returning with a spouse. Figure 4 shows how such pictorial details as bags and suitcases with gifts, money and other 'attributes of success' recede to the background.

Marriage prospects for girls appeared to be very high. One respondent, a social worker in a village administration, recounted a curious case: three local girls moved to an Arab country to work. Soon upon their arrival, they started calling their families begging to rescue them from slavery. Parents decided that the most effective and reasonable thing to do was to approach criminal networks. Following the networks' intervention, two girls could return. The incident could have been a sad warning about the dangers of unregulated migration, had it not been for an unexpected continuation. A few years later, a third girl who could not be rescued at a time, came home to introduce her wealthy husband to her parents. In the local community, she became a model of a successful migrant worker.

Still, attitudes towards women's marriage abroad remain contradictory. While some marriages of individual Kyrgyz women were recognised to be successful, generally, marriages to men from other faiths or nationalities were very much frowned upon.

Attitudes towards men and their marriages in migration were the opposite. Whoever Kyrgyz men marry, that would be considered natural and good. For example, young men in settlement no.5 found interfaith marriages of Kyrgyz men in migration beneficial to the nation and Muslim community. When the moderator asked them if men marrying women of another ethnicity should be written down as negative as well, the respondents replied:

M2: Надо написать, как негатив и то, что парни женятся на другой нации, нет?

A2: 'It should probably be written as positive as it is probably a positive thing' (everyone at once break into loud, long laughter). (51:38-51:42)

A7: 'When blood gets mixed, babies are born clever.'

A2: 'When marrying a girl from another religion, she becomes a Muslim, which is a good thing.'

A4: 'You get beautiful children' (laugh).

A5: 'Maybe pure-blooded' (laugh).

Attributes of success for men were often a car; if the car stood against a tropical background, it proved a complete success to the respondents.



Only in one case, the focus groups respondents acknowledged a specific woman with a professional career abroad as a success model. This woman was not an ordinary migrant worker performing unskilled work in a service industry. She built her career in her professional field and engaged in highly skilled work. Her fellow villagers, focus group participants, were inspired by her and considered her a successful role model: she was smart, rich, has a prestigious and exciting job, beautiful, cultured and patriotic.

When asked about their ideas of unsuccessful migrants, the respondents unexpectedly struggled. They said it was difficult for them to imagine such migrants. Although during the observation, respondents talked about examples of failure. For instance, there was a man who was not leaving his house anymore after returning home empty-handed, unable to cover the cost of airfare and who did not leave his house. There was a woman or a man who came back with a severe illness and were in dire need, unable to pay for medical treatment.

Imagery was 'complemented' by separate drawings made by respondents during focus groups discussions. The range of 'unsuccessful' villagers included people who could not afford to travel abroad (i.e. they could not get a loan to travel) and had to survive at home. Coincidentally, images of such people invoked negative stereotypes with their survival strategies being harmful to the environment. For example, one picture shows a man forced to cut down trees to get wood for heating his home.



Another example of failure is a man who became an alcoholic after return. Interestingly, negative results of unsuccessful migration were not only the person's failed expectations from migration, losing confidence, falling into despair, and becoming an alcoholic. They also included a risk of losing cultural identity in Russia. For example, a drunk man in Figure 7 was given a fictitious name 'Jura, representing a loss of his ethnic identity in labour migration, the destruction of the human person.

Interestingly, in all the focus groups and communities, the images of successful or failed villagers had no religious attributes. On the contrary, the drawings pointedly showed non-traditional clothing and appearance of female and male migrants.

Moreover, during focus group discussions, participants mentioned that the religiosity of Muslim people prevents their migration for work. U7, a young woman from Settlement no.5 said: *'For example, out of all religious people who adhere to Islam, only 10% can leave their wives behind and only because their family situation is very dire. Sharia permits leaving the wife alone, but there are many conditions. But first, when you leave, your wife becomes free. Second, there is a concept of family well-being (yrysky). If God blesses us with well-being, then money can be earned here staying home. People who adhere to Islam don't go abroad much.*

They are only forced to do it because of difficult life circumstances, lack of work, debts.'

Labour migration (to Russia) was seen as a danger to preserving Muslim identity. A young man from settlement no.7 said: *'For example, in our religion, a lot of things are forbidden, but there they can turn a blind eye to it, for example, eat pork.'*

The respondents' imagery portrayed migration as predominantly evil, a negative phenomenon to be avoided. Unsuccessful villagers were often portrayed as lonely, alienated figures regretting their migration past. U1, an older man from Settlement no.4 participants recalled: 'We heard that about ten years ago, a fellow villager got trapped in slavery. But now he's back; I won't name him. And here is a comparison. His neighbour is thriving compared to him, has a big house. We wanted to show in our drawing that even while staying and working in the village, you can find a job, earn and grow. We drew how he sits and regrets going to Russia, where he became entrapped. Had he stayed here, he would have lived almost like his neighbour. And now he is way behind.'

The contrasting images of an unsuccessful migrant and his successful villager, who prospered at home, and defining an unsuccessful villager as a person who lives in poverty, at the expense of natural resources, harming the environment, appear to be part of an anti-migrant discourse. This discourse appears to repeats word for word the messages that are used in projected by the media discourse and that are is reinforced and reproduced by different social groups on aat the community level. During the fieldwork, we discovered that this reproduction is carried out, first of all, by local religious leaders, heads of local self-governance, and business leaders[8].

1.1.2 .Discourse of religion and population's religiosity

Montgomery and Heathershaw noted that in the area of national and international security, the following myths about Islam in Central Asia were widely supported:

1. There is a post-Soviet Islamic revival;
2. To Islamicize means to radicalize;
3. Authoritarianism and poverty cause radicalization;

8. See details about anti-migration discourse and its 'drivers' in the next section.

4. Underground Muslim groups are radical;
5. Radical Muslim groups are globally networked; and
6. Political Islam opposes the secular state[9].

However, the analysis of respondents' communications during the study on religion and religiosity show that none of these myths had gained traction among most of them. On the contrary, most respondents viewed religion (Islamic religion) as a way of upbringing that leads to harmony and happiness, spiritual growth, as a means of saving the soul in a materialistic world. Respondents very positively viewed their children's religious education. According to U3, a young woman from Settlement 6: *'No parent wants bad things for their child, the Islamic religion is education. It teaches not to steal, not to use foul language. Any parent wants her child to grow up civilised, so you enrol them (in madrassas)'.*

Growth of religiosity was regarded as a positive societal change. According to U5, an older woman from Settlement 6: *'The rise of religion is a good thing as it calls for education an order. We have a lot of God-fearing people. If you ask help for carrying something, some will refuse, but God-fearing would not refuse, come at once and help all the way to the house. Parents are ok with that. They are happy with children becoming religious, having better manners. When people don't drink, home aura becomes cleaner.'*

Positive attitudes towards the growth of religiosity and institutional advancement of Islamic beliefs in Kyrgyzstan also came up in a recent survey by PIL[10]. In a national sample of 2,400 respondents, over half of the population were in favour of replacing secular law with Sharia.

Table 1. Answers to question: 'Are you for or against Sharia and Islamic laws becoming the official state law in our country where most population are Muslim?', N=2400

		Have you ever worked abroad?		Total
		Yes	No	
Are you for or against Sharia and Islamic laws becoming the official state law in our country where most of the population is Muslim?	For	62%	58%	59%
	Against	30%	32%	32%
	I don't know	7%	9%	9%
	Refused to answer	2%	0%	1%
Total		100%	100%	100%

9. Heathershaw, J. and Montgomery, D., Миф о радикализации ислама в республиках Средней Азии в постсоветский период, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. p.2.
10. Gamza, D. and Jones, P., Religious Regulation and Political Mobilization in Kyrgyzstan Dataset, June 2019

Respondents who had worked abroad were more likely to support making Sharia an official state law.

As the survey did not define what Sharia law was, participants most likely interpreted Sharia in a variety of ways. This was more evident in respondents' subsequent statements that law should always be followed, even if it was contrary to their religious principles..

Table 2. Answers to 'Which of the following three statements best reflect your opinion?', N=2400

		Have you ever worked abroad?		Total
		Yes	No	
Which of the following three statements best reflect your opinion?	People should always follow their religious principles irrespective of the legal consequences	17%	19%	18%
	People should always consider the legal consequences, following their religious principles.	26%	29%	28%
	People should always observe the law even when it contradicts their religious principles.	55%	50%	52%
	I don't know	1%	2%	2%
Total		100%	100%	100%

These responses, just as the responses from the current focus group discussions, can be interpreted that most of the population supports Sharia by which they mean high morality and social justice, the rule of law and unrestricted access to justice for all citizens.

Similar results were obtained in another study by Montgomery[11] in 2005, where 51% of respondents considered that state legislation should reflect religious law. According to Montgomery and Heathershaw (2014[12]), 'these results may be better understood in terms of the state being seen to act immorally and its reform being framed in terms of religion as the source of moral authority.'

The discourse on religion often actualises the division into 'true' faith and its imitation and following false tenets. Thus, participants in focus group discussions often 'exposed' behaviour of 'Muslims only on a surface'.

11. Research data from 2005 survey of 829 respondents on religious and cultural practices, conducted by Montgomery in Osh and Naryan Oblasts of Kyrgyzstan. See. David W. Montgomery, The Transmission of Religious and Cultural Knowledge and Potentiality in Practice: An Anthropology of Social Navigation in the Kyrgyz Republic (Religious Studies, Boston University, 2007).

12. thershaw, J. and Montgomery, D., Миф о радикализации ислама в республиках Средней Азии в постсоветский период, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p14

Such discourse was usually supported by older women, not strictly following the Islamic precepts. In a spirit of patriarchy, revelations were directed specifically at other women, typically young. For instance, older women from Settlement 7 shared the following:

U11: 'Lots of women started wearing the burqa.'

U7: 'Some girls of loose morals wear hijab to get married. They think that men see girls in hijab as religious and well-mannered.'

U6: 'Some women wear hijab to be fashionable, out of curiosity, but who knows what their souls are like.'

U10:' I don't like women wearing hijab. My neighbour's daughter-in-law wears one. She tells her mother-in-law that she won't sweep the street and only will clean inside the house. We also do men's jobs. But religious women divide responsibilities into men's and women's.'

U6: 'Girls who wear hijab when they get married try to persuade husband's female relatives to do the same. And somehow a year later they're wearing hijabs.'

U10: 'My neighbour suggested I wear a hijab, but I refused. I said my soul is with God.'

U9: 'We have a girl studying in Bishkek in a medical college. Parents in migration. When talking on the phone, her mother always asked how she was doing there and whether she became spoiled. The girl got fed up with that all, and she put a hijab on. She told her parents that she had become religious. And she goes to nightclubs at night.'

In male focus groups, division between true and false believers tended to distinguish between the supporters of 'traditional', 'correct' Islam and the recruits of radical and violent extremist movements. Respondents generally estimated that some citizens, because of their religious ignorance, were much more susceptible to extremist ideologies. It was assumed that recruiters operate as a secret network that never sleeps, always hunting for and trying to recruit new adherents. For instance, older men from Settlement 4, said the following:

U2: 'There is a link to migration. People are told about a good job abroad and then taken there to get brainwashed'.

U3: 'They can be deceived by money, being told that instead of working with concrete all day long, they can make easy money in 5 minutes.'

U4: 'They target people in need of money, weak people. A person you know can pull you up there. They look at a person's psychology and whether if he is naive, uneducated. If they don't understand religion, they are easily recruited.'

There was a widespread perception among a particular group of men that the evidence of Muslims carrying out extremist and terrorist acts was false. These respondents believed that a rise of religiosity did not have negative consequences, but there were forces interested in denigrating Islam and that people should not trust the propaganda of these forces about terrorists being among Muslims. Older men in Settlement no.5 expressed confidence that devout Muslims cannot become terrorists.

U9: 'Perhaps, he was taught that it was right to kill a person, that it was necessary to blow up all. Or maybe he was threatened that his family would be harmed. And anyone can say 'Allahu Akbar', not only a Muslim but also a Baptist and an atheist. If only Muslims could pronounce these words, then everything would be clear to everyone. Then they would be certain that Muslims did it.

U7: 'Yes. Only two things lead to radicalism. The first is provocation putting Islam in a bad light. And the second is those people who sell out for money and do such things under the guise of Islam.'

Continuing the discourse of anti-Islamic conspiracy, some respondents expressed radical opinions about who were dangerous to the society, who carried out terror. According to U7, an older man in Settlement 5:

The threat is not in religious movements but democratic organisations. For example, any organisation that promotes democratic values, changes mindsets of youth and educates people, can pose a threat to our society. There are democratic organisations that are a threat to our society; they want same-sex marriage, it's horrifying, you could say they're cutting people alive. Now by the term 'religion' we immediately mean Islam. And if we talk about Islam, everyone imagines that "Allahu Akbar" means that someone is going to kill people. In my opinion, religion is not a threat. I believe that the greater danger for us comes from these democratic organisations, they are real terrorists.

Исследователь Бенедикт Андерсон много десятилетий назад обо-снThe field study showed that people in different communities talked about their own, not tied to a common location, sense of belonging to a uniform, collective religion - Islam. How is that possible? Also, we reached to the following conclusion from the field study: despite being from country's different geographical locations that did not have apparent links and communicational exchanges, men and women articulated similar ideas about the future of the state and the authority[13].

13. In the two northern districts and in the south, in one area, the respondents talked about a plan to promote political Islam through democratic procedures in 2020. In addition, in various places, respondents raised questions about risks of society in connection with 'offensive' and promoting homosexual relations and referred to the Islamic religion as a 'natural barrier to unnatural relations' and that it is so important to introduce sharia morality in matters of sexuality. According to the researchers' testimonies, the discourses that were being reproduced in different places were identical.

Decades ago, political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson validated political unity as based on a sense of belonging to a nation that was essentially an imagined community. When explaining the success of this imagined community which could transcend religious, class differences, Anderson found that the ability to imagine was in an audience's ability to read newspapers and novels in the same language. In terms of our realities, we are justified to pose the following question: could the significant rise in the audience of religious information/media channels be a basis for forming new (Muslim) solidarity?

It seems that more or less unified discourse is provided by the institutional mechanisms that promote religious knowledge and information - by mosques for men and by religious lessons for women ('taalim sabagy') controlled and regulated by local structures of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, as well as very popular online information resources of prominent religious leaders (YouTube channels of Jalilov, Narmatov, Arstanbek, etc.). While it cannot be said that this discursive space covers 100% of the population all over Kyrgyzstan, it can be argued that the majority are participants in such communicational processes. That is, despite its intermitting nature, discourse about religion as a desirable and indispensable common future and present does create a common discursive field[14].

1.1.3. Discourse about criminality

Another most popular discourse in several pilot communities was about criminal networks and their role in the development of the family, society and the state.

When talking about criminal networks and authorities, people mainly used positive characteristics. Respondents told researchers that 'their' environment had the rigorous rule of law (admittedly, not state law but laws of the underworld), justice was carried out, and that they were strict but fair. A female respondent retold a story from the 1990s about 'Robinhood' actions of criminal authorities. They helped villagers save a municipal kindergarten and support children from vulnerable families in difficult economic situation. The woman recalled how she had approached all relevant agencies for help, pleading not to abandon the kindergarten to fend for themselves, to no avail. Kindergarten had no food to feed the children, lacked basic sanitation and hygiene. Suddenly, one day, trucks started coming to the kindergarten carrying foodstuffs, washing and laundry items, and other essential goods.

14. It is no coincidence that the language of communication among the population is changing so rapidly - no one uses the Kyrgyz words 'adal' - everyone says 'Khalal', no one uses the words 'keneshme' - say 'mashfara' ... The efforts of the State Commission on Religious Affairs and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan to localize the religious language and make it a natural, unborrowed part of the Kyrgyz language were unsuccessful. In some mosques, posters initiated by the department and the department are still hanging calling for Muslims to speak Kyrgyz. The posters provide translations of the most used Arabic words.

That turned out to be a donation from criminal bosses which kept the kindergarten afloat for few months until budgetary support kicked in and village children continued to receive appropriate care.

Every time respondents compared current state and municipal leaders with criminal bosses, officials lost. Positive appreciation of criminal authorities combined their romanticised image, their depiction as kind and fair Robinhoods, as well as emphasised their status as devout Muslims, who contribute 'soopchuluk' (good deeds) for poor and regular folks, build mosques and glorify Allah. Respondents stated that members of criminal groups, their leaders, who influenced entire communities, had been previously part of state structures, predominantly as elected deputies of the local councils ('kenesh'). They could distance themselves from the executive branch, critically asses its activities as well as retain the ability to influence the decision-making when necessary.

ajority of respondents endowed criminal groups and their bosses with attributes of effective and fair 'managers' in a given location, describing them as harsh but merciful, firm but not targeting poor people, being real patriots of Kyrgyzstan despite being outlaws.

Respondents in one community told the researchers privately that their settlement was managed by a group of criminal 'athletes' whose leader recently 'joined the local government'. In another community, respondents admitted that when a tragedy happened, many went to pay respects to a certain 'Bulgarian'. That person could solve problems of any level of complexity: achieve justice for desperate applicants in local courts; rescue relatives from an unfavourable situation even abroad because of the extensive transnational connections of the underworld. Finally, in a third settlement, respondents reported that the community leaders and religious figures were related to criminal bosses or had criminal past themselves, which enabled them to make a 'career'.

Youth in one pilot settlements were keen on joining the ranks of famous criminal groups. In one host family, a researcher noted that the youngest son was only interested in YouTube videos about the lives of criminal bosses and he was proud to be related to one of the bosses of the past. In another pilot settlement, in early days of participant observation, a field researcher was taken by surprise when, instead of a traditional handshake, young men extended to the researcher their clenched fists. The researcher regarded this gesture as a hidden threat and found that the local male youth culture resembled criminal subculture.

Previous studies on migration[15] registered the presence of non-isolated examples of organised criminal groups composed of young Kyrgyz men in Russia. These criminal groups worked to control and suppress aggression against compatriots working abroad, interpreting their criminal acts as an act of patriotism, protection of national dignity and preservation of women's morals. That is, the criminal subculture of youth easily transcended national borders and most visibly designated them as patriots of the fatherland.

Summing up the discussion of the three discursive topics, we can say that:

- There are two approaches to migration which are opposite in form: first, the apparent anti-migrant approach stigmatising poor migrants and, second, and approach that seemingly justifies the inevitability of labour migration with practical benefits which in turn results in high economic expectations of migrant workers. However, the second approach considers the female emancipation, changing family roles of men and women, changing practices of interactions between children and parents as absolute evil. In this regard, the discourse of migration, in general, can be defined as anti-migrant in content;
- Both religious and criminal discourses support anti-migrant discourse, even though they appear to be neutral;
- Overall, the popularity of religious and criminal discourse normalises the phenomena themselves and the anti-migrant sentiments they convey, creating a foundation for the legitimisation of power of certain groups in communities.

2.2. Systems of power and legitimisation in communities

The discursive picture presented in the previous section reflects on an essential aspect of power and legitimation in communities. Who makes decisions at the community level? Who, what structures are recognised as legitimate in governance, what types of relationships and behaviours are normalised at the local level? These and other questions about power and the legitimisation of power seem to be most important for understanding the changes taking place in communities.

As we believe that every community forms a specific configuration of forces and relationships, in this section, we present comparative data on several studied settlements.

15. Gender and Migration. Platform of Central Asia in Movement. 2013 (unreleased report), Article, 'Male political unconsciousness and the future of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan', Gulnara Ibraeva and Anara Moldosheva, 2013

Settlement 6

Settlement 6 is different from other pilot settlements and has the following unique features:

- It had a wealthy entrepreneur whose business allowed several families to earn income all year round;
- There was a local legend about villagers descending from an aristocratic nobility of the Kyrgyz people and their land being the best in the whole country: fertile, rich. It was not their destiny to work abroad like others. Residents mostly believed that intelligent and hard-working people could earn decent money at home. They thought that their village was attractive for internal migrants.
- In reality, a considerable number of residents lived in the grip of loans and could not break away from the cycle of poverty. Villagers resorted to small loans not only from financial institutions but also from 'private' short-term loan lenders charging high interest. Most residents were forced to borrow money for various occasions – for rituals, for sending off a relative work abroad, and for unforeseen urgent expenses in case of diseases, etc. For a specific part of the villagers living in debt had long become a way of life.
- As migration carried stigma, labour migrants tended to be from the most impoverished families, and their number was negligible.
- Though the wealthy entrepreneur was in unspoken conflict with the head of self-government, their public views on migration were the same: if people were not lazy and stupid, they could prosper at home. Such views were also supported by a local imam, who provided their further reinforcement with 'religious' arguments, including on the undesirability of migration for Muslim men, and called for a complete ban on migration for Muslim women.
- There was no consensus among residents about who held authority and power in their community. One person thought it was a religious leader - an imam who had been popularising an Islamic education for children in the previous few years. Another person disagreed, reciting imam's weaknesses and doubting his authority, and proposed that old party leaders were a local 'elite'. Yet another person said that the wealthy entrepreneur had the most considerable influence. So, the settlement's configuration of power reflected an absence of dominant forces, established elites with a decisive influence on people's opinions and decisions, although in some matters either businesses or religious leaders could wield considerable power.

Convergence of power positions took place within an anti-migrant discourse that essentially stigmatised the poor.

The village space can be visualised as two opposite life concepts. First concept was promoted by the businessman and his family and leaned towards transparency and openness, a revival of forgotten traditional ways of communal life, with no locks or theft. Second concept was promoted by most population, including the head of the administration and the religious leader, and leaned towards more segregation, creating enclosures and homes surrounded with impenetrable fences[16].

Residents repeatedly stated their village was friendly and that its indestructible solidarity ('yntymak') was based not on division by ancestral groups, but on neighbourhoods and streets where people lived. Public spaces were delineated by the grounds of a local municipal school which became a centre of community life. It hosted Nooruz festival or other celebrations[17]. A quick inquiry into past events discovered the existence of multiple socio-economic divisions and conflicts between groups with different confessional, economic, and other interests. We heard that several years ago, informal local leaders did not allow the burial of the body of a compatriot who had died abroad because of the rumours that the deceased and her relatives had changed their faith. Relatives of the deceased had to swear on the Quran and recite passages from the Quran ('kelme') to prove that they were Muslims and had the right to bury their relative in their native land.

Several years ago, the community tried with the support of their religious leader[18] to introduce a ban on alcohol sales. However, shop owners and traders[19] could not come to terms with losing their income, where alcohol sales had a significant share.

16. A female fielled researcher noted how the local residents witnessed of the expansion of the business complex. Increasing number of households sold off their land which were then absorbed by the growing complex. In this way, the compex without fences can symbolise ongoing territorial expansion and a victorious power symbol that indicates that no one can enter the space without the owners' permission and without the fences. Residents' desirability of high fences can be interpreted as a defence mechanism against open expansion of business space.

17. It is useful to note that in this and other settlements, state bodies organised activities to celebrate special days holidays which mostly did not resonate and were supported by the population at the family or community levels. For instance, state organised activities to celebrate Independence Day, Day of Kalpak, 23 February – Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland, 8 March -International Women's Day, New Year and others. Most families celebrated only religious holidays – Eid, as well as Nooruz; some families also celebrated birthdays, Nooruz and religious Eid.

18. It is important to note that the settlement did not have a permanent mosque employee – Imam Hatib; imam came once a week, for Friday prayer and sermons. There was an imam from local people who was accepted by the population as religiously educated and they called him imam. He managed the jamaat and organised people's schedule of duties to call for prayers. He promoted religion very actively: for instance, organised a summer madrasa for local boys aged 8 to 16. The local imam was a businessman himself, he tended to big pastures and runs a medispa with the use of horse milk seasonally.

19. Retail kiosks trading small goods.

Few days after the introduction of the ban, alcohol was on sale again. So, the power of the imam and his ability to manage the community were much restrained by the local economy and residents' material aspirations. A different example was where the main mosque and its leader could not fix access to drinking water. Few years ago, when the problem was very acute, they got a donation from Arab countries to be used for drilling a water well. A monumental arch with Arabic inscriptions marked that undertaking. However, the new well could not supply water to everyone without interruption; perhaps, it was not deep enough and only accessed processed groundwater. Water supply issue was resolved by the wealthy entrepreneur who mobilised the community and offered a fair division of labour: he bought pipes and other necessary consumables and villagers dug trenches and stack them. Since then there were no issues with safe drinking water supply and almost half of the households connected to water infrastructure and could install shower, bath, toilets, washing machines, etc.

Nevertheless, focus groups showed that the wealthy entrepreneur was not liked very much. When discussing successful villagers, respondents avoided calling him by his name and mostly referred to his deceased father – a founder of their family business.

Most villagers held their elder and the head of their administration in little regard. Meetings had been convened infrequently and mostly took place in a neighbouring village preventing many residents from attending. Top local government officials did not seem particularly interested in involving the community in decision-making processes. There was not a single informational board in the village; necessary public notices were displayed in a local shop. Before 2008, local authorities and school management conducted 'ideological' experiments which reproduced a Soviet practice of initiating schoolchildren into 'pioneers' and organising 'pioneer' activities. In more recent years, local authorities, as agents of the state, had to mobilise public celebrations of various events such as, for instance, Day of a National Hat ('kalpak'). Despite all efforts, they could not build close ties with the villagers.

Settlement 1

Settlement 1 presented a different configuration of power groups. The settlement itself was an outcome of active migration flows. After Slavic and other ethnic groups relocated abroad two decades ago, the village was taken over by three waves of internal migrants. One group of migrants were ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan, who had tried to resettle to other villages in Kyrgyzstan before arriving there. This group mostly kept to themselves despite being relatively large. It consisted of extended family networks that enabled their successful adaptation to the territory without a close

integration with the existing community. It is important to note that this group was most devout and actively practised all religious rituals.

Among most significant community groups were religious leaders. The group was not very united and had a dozen imams of local mosques, including two Islamic leaders who sought the position of chief imam. The warden of the main mosque (Juma Mosque) imam U.U. was appointed by the Muftiyyat and mentored by a very influential theologian in Kyrgyzstan. However, it was imam H.H. who carried more weight with people and was always invited to perform ritual services. Imam H.H. believed himself to be more senior because of his educational level. Rest of religious leaders tended to their neighbourhoods with the help of their families: husbands preached to men at local mosques and wives organised lessons for female neighbours. Imams' hidden conflict which kept creeping into public discussions (for instance, H.H. declaring U.U.'s lack of Islamic knowledge) was not only about their status but also about economic and political benefits. Chief imam could legitimately charge for a range of services - from exorcising demons and healing souls ('dem saluu') to reading a prayer before the person's burial ('janaza') and conducting Islamic circumcisions. Also, when dealing with law enforcement agencies or other authorities, those supported by the Directorate of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan were less vulnerable.

In addition to conflicts in a religious sphere, imam U.U. was on bad terms with heads of local institutions. For instance, head of a local kindergarten had been lobbying the village council and rural administration for the return of a nursery building which was temporarily given to ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan to use as a mosque 25 years ago. In response, imam U.U. spread rumours about kindergarten using pork to feed children.

The settlement had quite a few small and medium businesses, but their impact on the community was not significant, business people were also absent from public life. Most residents, especially the resettlers, were too afraid to borrow money. At time of need, ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan turned to their extended families for help. People steered clear of loans because of their religious principles, but according to few respondents, some villagers could not avoid incurring large debts from microcredit companies and banks. All groups wanted to seek state benefits, however small; many respondents asked PIL researchers about options for low-income and large families to receive benefits. Even residents with a relatively substantial capital (more than one car, house, livestock animal) sought information about state benefits as they perceived themselves as unemployed and poor since their income-generating work was 'in the shadows'.

Though almost invisible, criminal networks' influence and popularity were markedly evident in respondents' conversations. These networks helped develop such village 'infrastructure' as a sports club, mosque. Respondents also mentioned that, in dire need, villagers turned to these networks and got help.

Settlement 3

In this settlement, everything from the provision of vital social services and benefits to the administration of religious rituals was controlled by the local self-governance authority whose head was also firmly embedded in a district and other further levels of systems of control and power. Most residents were ethnic minorities, under an unspoken scrutiny of national security and internal affairs agencies. For total increased control of people's lives, residential areas were divided into neighbourhoods with an informal leader who had been tasked with keeping an eye on the residents. Access to information technology for young girls and women was vigilantly monitored. Young girls were usually not permitted to have modern mobile phones, as such devices were regarded as an evil that could seduce and corrupt the girls. Family, schools, and madrassas reinforced girls' restricted access to mobile communication and the internet. These restrictions were reiterated during sermons in mosques. In public spaces, the head of the municipality always declared loyalty to the management course of central authorities and noted improvements in the settlement. The local population well understood his engagement with the systems of control over national security, and they could well perceive the difference between his rhetoric and the reality in practice. In general, the community seemed to lead a closeted life, with diverging rhetoric and practice and a deliberately public demonstration of the satisfaction with the direction of changes, which appeared to be their way of adapting to an environment of total absence of freedom [20].

These examples and the table of the ratio of power and the power legitimisation show that each settlement's system of power and domination was based on different groups of influence. In one place, a municipal government was crucial to the community life; in another, the state had only marginal power and depended on religious, criminal or business leaders. We can conclude that configurations of power have multiple forms, are transitory, and often detached from local populations.

Everywhere, the poor were particularly vulnerable to the actions of groups with power. In one settlement, people living in poverty said that state social assistance was not accessible for them as their village was regarded as well-off; those in real need could not receive 'targeted' support.

20. See Appendix [..] for the description of main characteristics of power configurations and resources of their legitimisation in seven settlements.

In another settlement, local lenders developed specific credit products for poor people (for example, loans to pay for travel to find work abroad), which further increased risks of poor people falling into debt bondage. In a third settlement, poor people were trapped in a double bind of anti-migrant discourse. On the one hand, accumulating debts and community standards of consumption and lifestyle force them into labour migration. On the other hand, migrants risk being stigmatised as people who failed to be useful at home.

In their study of a global crisis of neoliberal development, researchers M. Hardt and A. Negri formulated a critical thesis:

The triumph of neoliberalism and its crisis have shifted the terms of economic and political life, but they have also operated a social, anthropological transformation, fabricating new figures of subjectivity. The hegemony of finance and the banks has produced the indebted. Control over information and communication networks has created the mediatised. The security regime and the generalised state of exception have constructed a figure prey to fear and yearning for protection — the securitised. And the corruption of democracy has forged a strange, depoliticised figure, the represented. These subjective figures constitute the social terrain on which — and against which — movements of resistance and rebellion must act ... [...][21].

Existence of a critical mass of the indebted, the mediatised and the securitised, whose civil and political rights are appropriated by small competing groups of local elites 'representing' large migrant population is the essence of real life of the studied communities in Kyrgyzstan.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature about research on migration is vast. Studies about transformations of family and gender roles and the impact of migration on local communities take place worldwide. The Table in Appendix 1 lists key literature sources used for the desk research for this report.

We reviewed a vast diversity of methodological approaches:

- Traditional structural, positivist and behavioural studies aimed at revealing the objective patterns of migration of a rational person (homo economicus); and the specific ways a person adapts to migratory environments; and the influence of the push and pull factors.
- Interpretive approaches that allow to focus on migrants' motivation and their aspirations.

21. Hardt, M., Negri, A., Субъективные фигуры кризиса, http://politconcept.sfedu.ru/2015.1/06.pdf

- Alternative (transformative) approaches that consider migration not as a linear process but as taking place in a historical context and recognising the right to freedom of movement and the protection of migrants' rights across transnational borders.

In the context of post-Soviet countries of Central Asia and particularly in Kyrgyzstan, most studies used traditional approaches posing normative questions that reflect a 'top-down' approach:

- Whether the studied phenomena good or bad for the state? How the state benefits/loses from (receiving/sending) migration transfers?
- How to protect the state from the adverse effects of migration? Whether people use transfers from migration in the correct way?
- What are the links between migration and radicalisation? Whether migration policies should be harsher or more liberal?

Such traditional approaches can be illustrated by a range of biased publications about the interrelationship of migration and radicalisation. They depict the Central Asia region as a hotbed of global religious extremism and terrorism - an outcome that can be very useful to different capitals. The apparent main task of such literature is to give an interpretation of occurring phenomena and practices that suits the current ideologies. Despite the availability of many critical assessment tools for measuring and establishing degrees of radicalisation[22], only one has been used in Central Asia.

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22. Community- Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force, Report to Human Factors/ Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010; Davydov, D., G., Khlomov, K., D., Методика диагностики диспозиций насильственного экстремизма; Soldatova G., U., et al, Экспресс-опросник 'Индекс толерантности'; Borum. R., Psychological Vulnerabilities and Propensities for Involvement in Violent Extremism, 2014; Harper, E. (ed), Social identity and radicalization: A Review of Key Concepts, WANA, 2017; Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+)/Lloyd & Dean, 2015 Lloyd, M., & Dean, C. (2015); Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF);The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)/ Roberts and Horgan, 2008; Multi-level guidelines (MLG) for the assessment and management of group-based violence /Cook et al. ,2013; Structured Risk Guidance (SRG);RADAR/Australian government

23. PIL - Mutakalim, Определение уровня знаний женщин и молодежи о радикализации и насильственном экстремизме, 2018.

Central Asia is a relatively stable region with very low levels of armed conflict and terrorism compared to its neighboring regions of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The primary political trend in Central Asia is not accelerated instability and conflict but the gradual consolidation of authoritarian regimes, of varying degrees of repression, in at least four of the five states[24].

Even when literature on migration processes does include the social aspects of migration, the real experiences of migrants and their families, and the consideration of issues from 'bottom-up', this literature gives them a supporting role, emphasises the 'dangers' of migration and 'vulnerability' of migrants.

In practice, studies that comprehensively cover the context of the family are non-existent. Existing studies fragment the issues and 'dilute' the impact of the changes in workload and labour division within households, etc.'. Instead, these studies propose to investigate various subject groups (the elderly, the children, the women, the young) through the lens of vulnerability. On the one hand, they often omit the processes of a family transformation and becoming less uniform. A wider diversity of family relationships with their tendency to change and reconfigure over time is often recognised to be part of 'modern family'. On the other hand, 'family' theories actively challenge the concept of family as a set of fixed, biologically or legally determined relationships. Instead, such theories underline the importance of practices, responsibilities and emotional relationships involved with the processes of family 'making' and 'creating'.

Our research methodology incorporates the following tools:

- An analysis/formation of 'models' of labour migrations in changing economic and political contexts – a 'neoliberal crisis' where financial institutions, media, and security regimes increasingly tighten their control over labour practices and economic productivity;
- An analysis of migration processes at the meso level, which includes experiences of families, households, communities. The relevance of group-level analysis is twofold. First, individuals rarely make decisions about migration in an absolute vacuum, especially given that their remittances are integral to the families' households. Second, families send off their loved ones to work far away not only to raise the absolute value of their household income, but also to reduce the deterioration of their family position compared to peer groups ;

24. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation, at https://caa-network.org/archives/8258

- A critical approach to the conventional descriptions of migrants, in part the concept of migrants' vulnerability. The definition of such vulnerability remains vague/fluid; it is continuously challenged in academic, political and legal discussions. Once a group of people are categorised as vulnerable, they become normalised as an 'excluded' group. Such categorisation invokes stereotypes, which can reinforce clichés, the dehumanisation and stigmatisation of the very 'vulnerable' groups on whose behalf the need for protection is declared. The use of qualitative research methods enables, on the one hand, access to the living experiences of migrant families and different contexts influencing connections and development of migratory strategies and identities. On the other hand, such methods restrict possibilities to generalise the research objects.

CHAPTER 2.
FAMILY IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

2.1. Family structure, family roles and migration

According to the 2009 census, at least half of all households were nuclear families living independently (see Diagram 1).



Source: *http://www.stat.kg/media/files/3a28b843-ebf7-41fd-a70b-50c8236d0ef2.pdf*

So, in at least half of the households, decisions on whether household members migrate, or return could be taken at the level of nuclear family[25]. But in countries with predominantly patriarchal culture, including Kyrgyzstan, in-laws and distant relatives, living separately but still being part of a large extended family, have a strong influence too. Often, such extended families determine male and female relatives' migration trajectories and strategies of departure or return.

According to respondents, a person's position in a family determined his or her migration opportunities and strategies:

- A young migrant man with an arranged marriage usually left his wife with his parents. He would visit home briefly, usually once a year. His wife would have little prospect of working abroad with their husbands or on their own;
- Youngest sons were forbidden from migrating by their parents and siblings who would take over the duty to provide for them since the youngest sons' duty was to look after parents. As families did not welcome or support youngest sons' aspirations to work abroad, these men usually stayed home;
- In case of a young married couple living with men's parents, parents would typically have to approve the couple's migration plans.

25. Traditionally in the western literature, migration is considered as a phenomenon relating to individuals and households based on a nuclear family. See details in the article by Anu Kõu, Clara H. Mulder & Ajay Bailey (2017) 'For the sake of the family and future': the linked lives of highly skilled Indian migrants, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43:16, 2788-2805, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1314608

Still, female respondents from Chui oblast were able to prevent their husbands from working abroad, leaving their wives behind with men's parents. For instance, U5, a young woman from Settlement 4 said: 'I just gave birth and did not want to be alone, I was the youngest daughter-in-law and did not want to stay with my mother-in-law. So, I did not let him go as he could work here the same amount of money, for instance, in three days one can earn 10,000'. In Settlement 3, young women respondents collectively said their husbands had informed them about going to work abroad just before the departure time and that the women had not been able to persuade to stay. When respondent U9 said that their husbands were not interested in the wives' opinion at all, several women reiterated this opinion repeatedly. Respondent U9 added that men only consulted and made decisions with their mothers. When respondent U4 said that husbands mentioned their departure almost in passing, show their tickets and women had to take it as fact, all respondents laughed;

- After divorce, young women often went abroad, usually on the insistence of their parents or close relatives. Migration seemed to be the way for female divorcees and their relatives to avoid stigma and societal discrimination;
- If a young couple had a child (children) while working abroad, childcare needs usually triggered the next chain of labour migration with the wife's mother, sister or niece most likely arriving to help.

In widespread public opinion, migration affects traditional family roles and destroys traditions. However, academic experts on migration, such as Nasritdinov, made a more balanced observation that migration gave some traditions more reinforcement:

It is also curious that migration actively employs existing traditions such as, for instance, leaving the first child with grandparents, a widespread practice during the Soviet times, which got even stronger nowadays. Another tradition is a somewhat 'exploitative' relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, which is also very beneficial advantageous in the conditions of migration. Finally, the tradition of leaving the youngest son to look after parents relieves his older siblings from the caring duty and allows them to go without any remorse [26].

Field studies helped provide a more detailed analysis of the situation in families, including real roles, relationships and practices in families affected by labour migration.

26. Nasritdinov, E., Миграция в Кыргызстане: взвешивая все за и против, https://www.academia.edu/4371896/Миграция_в_Кыргызстане_взвешивая_за_и_против

2.1.1. Religion and transformation of gender roles in the family

Upon its independence, Kyrgyzstan inherited Soviet ideas of the state's total presence with corresponding privileges, benefits, social infrastructures to support women's motherhood and employment[27]. As such state presence diminished, the role of the private sphere and the institution of marriage and family in the reproduction of the patriarchy increased. Practices of everyday life used to be based on a gender order reflecting traditional patriarchal values of reverence, obedience, and submission to elders and husband. Usually, the husband's power was not unconditional, but there was still a need for its traditional representation[28]. For twenty years after the breakdown of Soviet gender order, the actual gender order has prevailed over a rhetorical one (where eldest man was a breadwinner and chief decision-maker in the family). In reality, older woman, mother-in-law[29], had the power and used it to oppress younger members of her family, children, and, particularly, her daughter-in-law. Though her husband's role was still presented to society as most important, in practice, he was often also oppressed due to the widespread inability of men to play expected gender roles of breadwinners and providers. So, it was no coincidence that in male participants of focus groups from Settlements 5 and 6 reiterated that they had been forced to migrate to escape spousal pressure for fulfilling traditional male family roles (Settlements 5 and 6). Sometimes they added that there were not enough jobs for men abroad; so, women had to migrate with men staying home to look after children.

During the participant observation, the disparity between a rhetorical and real power in families manifested itself frequently. In one family (Settlement 3), a grandfather's seniority was acknowledged by his wife (grandmother), grandchildren, extended family, and neighbours. Before his retirement, the grandfather tried to earn money and provide for his family in different ways. He tried working in Kazakhstan where he was deceived, and so he had to return without getting paid. He also went to Russia but had to come back with no money and in poor health. His entrepreneurial initiatives back home ended in bankruptcy; when he tried a paid job, his colleagues turned out to be alcoholics and caused him to drink heavily. In the end, his family made an unspoken decision that the grandfather should no longer try to provide for them.

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27. Academics referred to this ideological model of gender regime as patriarchal-etacratic. Etacratism is an ideology where the role of the state in the society is absolute and the state is assumed to intervene widely and actively in economic and social lives of the society. Etacratic nature of gender order defined privileges, benefits, social infrastructure and other things related to motherhood and female employment. See Anna Temkina, «Подчинение старшим» vs. Разрушение патриархата: женская сексуальность в браке (Северный Таджикистан), Journal of Social Policy Studies, 2006, Vol 4(4), pp. 439-474, accessed on https://jsps.hse.ru/article/view/3690

28. Ibid, p.454

29. Woman's mother-in-law is the most powerful party because in Kyrgyz culture is characterised by patrilocal marriages where a young couple lives with man's parents, in the community with the husband's extended family.

At the time of observation, the grandfather did household work, including cooking dinners and growing produce on a rented agricultural plot; he also drove the grandmother to work and back.

The grandfather talked a lot about his mission as a family head, particularly about his duty to help all his children build their lives. One of his dreams had been building a house for his middle daughter, a divorcee. He proudly recounted how he had fulfilled his duty and built her the house. However, the construction turned out to be fully funded by the middle daughter herself, who had been working abroad. Apart from covering the construction costs and expenses of her children who lived with the grandparents, she sent him funds to buy a car, and she also bought him a smartphone. Interviews with the family members gave several examples of the grandfather's nominal power:

- The grandmother managed family finances, so the grandfather needed to account in detail for funds received to make specific purchases. According to a family legend, the grandmother had special talents, making money grow and stay safe, and therefore she became the family's accountant;
- The grandfather said that he had tried to make his daughter leave her husband and return home, because her husband drank, beat her, and was even once was arrested with drugs. He said he decisively confronted his wife saying that their son-in-law was a lost man and they needed to save their daughter. But the grandmother did not let him bring their daughter home telling home not to get involved as the daughter's two children would become orphans. She ended the discussion with a statement that in due time, their son-in-law would change, daughter's life would improve. So, the grandfather did not have the power to decide on the daughter's fate.
- When the observer began to interview the grandfather, the grandmother was busy cooking in the kitchen. As soon as she heard the grandfather talking about his life and family, she dropped everything, sat down and listened to his whole story. Such attention can most likely be interpreted as an exercise of control.
- Finally, the grandmother told the observer that one night her husband had very high blood pressure, but he did not dare to wake his wife and instead waited for her to wake up for the morning prayer and then asked her to give him an injection.

The primary trend identified in 16 families was that the older generation (15 out of 16), who grew up and lived in the Soviet Union, had very powerful women. Being practically matriarchs of their families, these women still

wanted to appear submissive and referred to their husbands as the heads of households. This approach was especially useful when a matriarch wanted to avoid responsibility for some decisions.

On the contrary, younger men, who grew up already in post-Soviet society, were more likely to have power in their nuclear family where wives were subordinate. Their mothers were strong women who already called the shots in their family and were keen to rule their son's family too. Despite mothers declaring their hopes that sons would make strategic decisions for the whole family, sons were given little chance to do so in reality. However, there were several families where mothers' authority had been challenged in the past few years. Increasingly, the religious knowledge and practices of a younger generation were perceived to be superior to their parents' and, therefore, correct; the perceived parental ignorance on religious matters disqualified them from leading certain practices.

During the fieldwork, sons and daughters with powerful mothers tried in various ways to change mothers' behaviour and life positions (fathers were rarely influenced). On several occasions, daughters expressed their disapproval of mothers' appearance and dress style, insisted that they wear a hijab (while admitting their husbands wanted them to do so). Several times sons were observed demanding their mothers to pray and follow other Pillars of Islam. In one household, a woman told her mother rather bluntly that 'Nooruz' (a widely celebrated spring festival) and 'syumyolyok' (a ritual dish made of sprouted grain) conflicted with Islamic traditions and that the mother should not make erroneous religious interpretations in the presence of others.

Young men from different settlements gave examples of children putting pressure on their parents to follow Islamic principles. One young man (U9) said: 'There are elderly Soviet people who could come along for a Friday prayer. One man went away on a 40 days 'davat' (preaching Islam) and, upon his return, told his parents to perform 'namaz' (the ritual prayers prescribed by Islam)... Soviet-era seniors do not listen to the young, and some even start drinking because of their children's transformation.'

A young woman from a focus group in Settlement 3 (U7) talked about her family: 'My mother, who works, recently greeted a male colleague by shaking hands. My brother's reaction to this was bad; he scolded our father for being silent when mother greeted another man and gave him her hand.'

Young men put intense pressure on young women, especially wives and sisters. One woman from Settlement 3 (U1) explained that religious young men could not always influence their parents. She gave an example of her very religious younger brother: 'sure thing he will talk to our father about religion, and they end up quarrelling. My brother tells who things should be

done according to our religion, but our father does not understand. He lived in the Soviet Union, and his opinion is already formed... They also influence younger ones to bring them into religion. If a woman's brother tells her to cover herself with a headscarf, she will obey. Parents cannot rule in such circumstances; they are not in charge. It affects our younger sisters. Their brothers tell them to dress in a certain way'.

In northern Kyrgyzstan, one young woman shared how she had tried to resist her husband's demand to accompany him for conducting 'davat' but was forced to do it anyway. That was just a beginning. Six years ago, her husband demanded she wore a niqab, removed all the house furniture, so they then slept and ate on the floor, and stopped watching TV. Children could not go to school for a long time. The woman dreamt of living 'modern' life; when her husband went preaching door to door, she took niqab off. Over the years, their family stopped being in touch with her relatives and joining their family events. The woman tried resisting in many ways, including going back to her parents, to no avail. Her husband occasionally beat her if she persisted. The woman had to ask local family health professionals in secret for their assistance. They pretended to be visiting all families in the neighbourhood so that her husband would not find out that she asked them to come. Also, in secret, she vaccinated her children and got contraception. While the fieldwork did not bring up other similar cases of violence against and oppression of women under a pretext of following true Islamic religion, practices of coercion into a religious diktat and resistance to it appeared to be commonplace.

Ho Men did not necessarily decide to resort to coercion all by themselves. Fieldworkers once observed male worshippers talking in a mosque about ways to bring women to 'davat'. One worshipper told their imam that he could not get his wife to agree to conduct 'davat' and added that he had tried to be 'gentle' and 'tough' by beating her repeatedly and she still resisted. The imam retorted that if a devout Muslim man could not convince his wife and children, he could hardly be acknowledged as someone who knew and lived following 'akyida' (Islamic teachings).

Religious practices promote gender segregation in everyday life, where men's and women's quarters are separated, and women are prohibited from interacting with unrelated men. In one household, a male observer was not able to join meals or conversations with all family members. During his stay, male members of the host family came to the guest quarters house to have lunch or dinner meal with him. The female members of the family ate in their own 'half' of the quarters. When asked for an interview, the hostess and her daughters-in-law refused point-blank. The observer asked the host for reasons women of the household were hidden that way and whether he

trusted his 'other half'. The host referred to an Islamic concept of 'dayus'[30], and it was sinful.

Thus, religious practices influence the (re-)distribution of power in the family, the 'normalisation' of new standards of femininity and motherhood, and the proliferation of male diktat and control over women on religious grounds, including in the form of domestic violence.

2.1.2. Who should migrate? Labour migrants and their parents

Traditionally in Kyrgyz society, relationships between fathers and children were based on instrumental values: from an early age, children were 'prepared' to serve family interests, preserve sacred kinship ties, and care for older relatives. Parental home usually went to a grown son (usually the youngest, in line with a principle of ultimogeniture), who took over the household reigns and looked after his parents in old age. Families considered girls as 'guests' who would leave the parental nest when married.

Post-Soviet Kyrgyz families appear to be changing substantially. On the one hand, a younger generation of fathers struggle with giving away the household power to their grown sons[31] and are also unable to provide sons with independent livelihoods. On the other hand, children try on the role of family breadwinners from an early age. Migration opens them the opportunities and delays the time when grown sons take over the household. In a nutshell, men's previous gender role and expectations to 'father a son, build a house, and plant a tree' changed into 'father a son, build a house for your parents and your own family, and plant a tree'.

Migration changes parents' attitudes toward girls. More and more often, parents express the need for maximising or getting benefits from having daughters before their marriage into another family. Once again, migration provides ample opportunity.

Interestingly, in focus group discussions and interviews, respondents often stated that girls' migration was more useful for families. Girls sent their parents more money more often. Job markets were also more favourable for girls who were more likely to find a job and less likely to be deceived by employers and not paid.

30. Dayus is a man who knows or assumes that his women committed wickedness and does not react to it properly. It is a man devoid of jealousy for his wife, daughters and other female relatives, i.e. he does not care what they do, with whom they communicate and how they dress. Jealousy is a feeling of disgust, rage and anger for close women and protecting them from the hands of transgressors and from the views of outsiders. And the one who has no jealousy becomes a dayus, a pimp who agrees to the corruption of his family, and as came in the hadith, such will not go to the heaven. https://umma.ru/dajus-svodnik-i-revnost-v-islame/

31. We suggest a hypothesis that in the past parents with many children retired by the time their youngest son became of age and nowadays, as a result of decreased birth rates, youngest sons marry when their parents are still relatively young and have not yet retired. Global trends also affect age-related behavior and delay retirement plans.

This perception explains why parents sent girls to work abroad at the earliest opportunity regardless of the high risks of 'damaged reputation' for girls.

For young daughters-in-law or divorced women, migration was a route to escape traditional cultural tyranny of the family and society. Young divorcees migrated with strong parental encouragement as the stigma carried by a divorced female relative cast deep shadows on their family. One fieldworker even noted that men and women referred to a family with a divorcee differently: when describing the family, men said that the family had a sauna while women reported that one of their daughters got divorced.

Choosing girls to work abroad for the family's benefit is not unique to Kyrgyzstan. In the review, Gender and Migration, its authors wrote:

Several studies of internal Filipino migrants showed that families were more likely to send their daughters to migrate considering women to be reliable in sending remittances. Families also allocate women and girls their roles (which in turn determine their relative motivation and incentive to migrate) and control the distribution of resources and information that can support, discourage or stop migration[32].

The review provided data on migration flows from Nicaragua to Costa Rica, where the prevalence of women was explained statistically: 9 in 10 women sent money home, while only 6 in 10 men did the same.

Our fieldwork showed many ways young and older family members perceived their prescribed roles and associated expectations.

The nature of relationships between parents and their migrant children was popularised through real-life stories posted on Facebook with a hashtag #ожизнимигрантоввРФ (about the life of migrants in Russia). Many respondents concurred with the author of the posts who thought stories were very typical. One story outlines a 'traditionally expected model' of a migrant girl's behaviour and her parents' position of 'supervising and normalising' behaviours:

Another flatmate of mine, Alina. She says she's been working in St. Petersburg for two years. She's 22 ... She said her parents took a business loan to buy a container for selling clothes in the village. It didn't work out, and the money was gone. The loan of 250,000 soms with annual interest of 16% shifted onto her shoulders, so every month she had to send 20,000 soms back home. There are three sisters in the family; the eldest is also in St. Petersburg; the youngest is still a schoolgirl. Her parents are young; her father is 42; her mother is 40. They are in good health, but they don't

32. Jolly, S., and Reeves, H., 'Gender and Migration. An Overview Report' in Bridge, The Cutting Edge Pack, 2005, Pp. 10

work. 'Dad does not want to leave the house unsupervised; mum doesn't go anywhere without him.' Often, when her salary is delayed at work, she gets loud voice messages from her mother, saying: 'Don't lie! What delay? The neighbour's daughter sent the money in the morning! Are we a burden to you? Be patient; you'll be rid of us soon!' This makes her cry... Late at night at home, we all give whatever money we have as we need to find her 20,000 rubles to send to her parents or she will be inundated by angry texts. We have a few people in one house and in 5 minutes manage to collect 20,000 rubles that she wires to her parents. 'Mum, I sent 20,000 roubles to your name,' she texts. The response she gets is a dissatisfied 'You did not have to lie and get on my nerves; couldn't you just send money earlier instead of pretending to have a delay!' ... Until the next month, there won't be any angry text messages, maybe only 'Daughter, my darling, top up our balance' or 'We are going to a celebration – send 1,000 rubles' or something like that.

It is important to stress that the daughter's abuse comes from her mother. Maternal tyranny is not a unique phenomenon and can be explained in terms of patriarchal relationships. Within a patriarchal system, the institution of motherhood carries a crucial functional meaning. Dorothy E. Roberts, a post-colonial feminist, argues that the social construction of motherhood forms a vital part of patriarchy and without it, such an 'effective' cultural tyranny and subordination of women, disciplining of children could not exist[33]. The point is not whether mothers could be emotionally unresponsive and tyrannical by nature, the point is that in every life situation involving children mothers are the ones 'appointed' by society to be responsible for children's behaviour. If a child behaves out of line with normative expectations, their mother is likely to act as a 'corrective' punitive tool. Otherwise, she risks becoming a victim of stigma and violence, being labelled as a mother 'inappropriately raised' her children. Migration of girls and young women present a significant challenge to their mothers.

On the one hand, the mother must minimise the risk of her daughter acquiring the stigma of being 'morally corrupt' and the subsequent risk of getting labelled as the mother with a 'misbehaving' daughter. Mother must prove to her husband, whose role is that of a home 'controller', and to the watchful society that her daughter leads 'correct', normatively prescribed life. Regular stream of remittances is evidence that her daughter behaves 'diligently' and while abroad she does not do anything but work.

Relationships between parents and their migrant children can take different, not only repressive, forms but almost always have patriarchal values as their foundation.

33. https://medium.com/applied-intersectionality/patriarchy-constructs-motherhood-e24a495f2084

The present research gathered cases where parents treated migration as an opportunity for girls to 'see the world, enjoy life' before the routine of married life begins. Still, daughters, whose mother wished them better lives, had a clear understanding of their rights and responsibilities in migration: they brought back home valuable gifts for parents and close relatives (which was expected –'only our poor daughter looks after us') or sent money for the demonstrative use at celebrations. In one family, a woman brought her mother gold jewellery, but the mother later pawned it and told the neighbours how she felt guilty towards the daughter for pawning her gifts[34]. In another family, a woman sent money before the International Women's Day, 8 March, so that her mother could invite sisters and friends to celebrate in a cafe.

For some respondents, labour migration was an opportunity to offset the failure of a traditional marriage strategy at home. In one family, the eldest daughter migrated to Turkey after her long-term boyfriend from a high-class family preferred marrying a girl from an affluent family. Going abroad, she could find a professional job with high earnings. Her parents were very proud of this, and in the eyes of society, the migration was justified.

Young men felt on occasion that migration was somewhat similar to military service during the Soviet times. It was a school of life, a ritual of initiation to become men, to understand and re-evaluate family values... Parents of particularly troubled young men hoped that migration would help their sons mature, learn about life, and even 'fix' some of their problematic habits. There were two families with a conflict between mothers and young sons and mothers even tried to encourage men to join older female acquaintances travelling abroad, who would keep their sons 'under control'. However, the attempts to delegate the responsibility for their 'problematic' sons did not work out. They also could not send young men on their own, believing that the costs of their working abroad without safety mechanisms could be way too high.

For many, labour migration became the opportunity to travel, have an adventure, and, perhaps, the only way to 'see the world'. The desire to 'see the world' had the absolute value for most population. 'Seeing the world' through labour migration was formed by media as possibly the only window of opportunity for people living below the poverty line. In this sense, labour migration gives impoverished people hope to reach advertised standards of consumption.

Despite the parental rhetoric about migration allowing their children to 'see the world', this opportunity was usually inseparable from the task of earning money for the family. Focus group participants often talked about

34. The fact that the woman shared her story openly shows that she did not fear her daughter particularly.

how life in migration changed young people's character.

They frequently expressed concerns about young people, especially young men, turning 'selfish', no longer sending remittances, and even losing touch with their families. Respondents explained that such 'selfish' people only thought about the present and themselves. The 'selfish' group sometimes included homeless migrants who could not 'stay afloat' and ended up living on the streets of major Russian cities. Respondents believed that homeless migrants in Russia were lazy and chose not to work.

The instrumentality and pragmatic attitudes of parents towards their children[35], presented in this chapter, raise many questions. Parental attempts to transfer a breadwinning role on their daughters (in violation of all gender stereotypes) and sons have a systemic causal nature. Most of the current generation of parents grew up during the Soviet period when a comprehensive set of social institutions had been catering to the population's needs. The military, a professional body, served as an initiation for young people to transition to adulthood. State social agencies and professional unions provided parents with social services and benefits, including housing, nursery or kindergarten for children, etc. One female respondent often reminisced about the opportunity to receive state housing three decades ago that she had missed despite being on top of a housing waiting list. Her husband forced her to leave the city almost on the eve of receiving the housing. A young respondent from Settlement 3, born after the collapse of the Soviet Union, regretted not being able to benefit from the state provision of land, houses or flats for young families. Young women in Settlement 3: *'Well, our family is big, we have 13 people, not enough room for everyone, we need to build, so we have families who left together into migration, parents in law left, my husband and I remained at home with our children and my husband's younger sister, the rest all migrated. They want to earn money for a house, for land, that's why they are away'[(U7). Another woman (U7) added: 'Yes, because, in my family, we are three sons and three daughters-in-law, all live together, each couple has one room, parents in law mother-in-law live in three rooms. So, that is why my husband also goes to Russia to buy a car and save money for building works.'*

Transition from a system where the 'father' state fed its people and provided for their basic needs through proposed strategies of behaviour to a system where each family must independently meet their own needs, with no support from state social institutions is, in fact, a critical transition. Often, those who did not know different times and living conditions and did not rely on government structures, could adapt better and find new behavioural strategies to ensure the reproduction of the family and its members.

35. The opposite also happens, when children at home require constant material help but such phenomenon has different psychological mechanism.

However, this transition has been putting families in crisis. Some families were unable to meet their subsistence needs or lost emotional support; others experienced an increase in domestic violence. For families in crisis, ***migration is a tool to compensate for the absent socio-economic support for families and dysfunctional or changing social institutions and not a misdiagnosed cause of a crisis of family institution.***

2.1.3. How are family relationships built, and why?

Fieldwork incorporated sociometric measurements of 15 families. The resulted showed four families with internal conflicts and others with mostly neutral or empathic relations[36]. In this section, we discuss 4 families with different sets of tensions and degrees of relation where enmity or hostility could be between a woman and her daughter-in-law, between different daughters-in-law living in the same household as part of a complex extended family; between children and grandchildren and even between parents /grandparents and children/grandchildren.

Family A

At the time of the observation, this family had four relatives living together: Gulzat[37], a female head of the household, her adopted son, her granddaughter (son of her second daughter), and grandson (son of her third daughter). The second daughter was working abroad, and the other two daughters lived separately from Gulzat in Kyrgyzstan and were about to migrate again. Gulzat was a retired, widow and a labour migrant herself in the 1990s.

36. See Appendix 2 for the methodology of sociometric measurements and the sociograms.
37. Not her real name.



This family's sociogram also includes other family and non-family members who were not part of the household. The main lines of relationships between adults in the household were reciprocal. For example, Gulzat talked about her affection for the adopted 16-year-old son, speaking of him as his heir, and the son showed love for his foster mother. Still, they were in constant conflict, with Gulzat berating him often and with the boy disobeying her and breaking his promises. The relationship between her son and 15-year-old granddaughter was incongruent: he was very emotional and empathetic towards her, repeatedly declaring that he would marry her; she treated him as a friend, even though she often argued with him perceiving that he had an unfairly small share of household work or he did not perform his duties at all. The relationship between her son and 6-year-old grandson was confrontational, conflicting. The son bullied and teased his nephew, had 'friendly fights' in a rather rough form, did not let him choose a TV channel or took away his candy. The confrontation would escalate when Gulzat scolded her son and expressed affection for her grandson.

The sociogram shows that Gulzat's son had actively external relationships with his maternal uncle, maternal cousin, and a family friend. Gulzat also had an unusually, for a rural pensioner, high level of activities, and engagement with various circles and social groups: relatives, classmates from school and university, tribal community, neighbours, community activists, friends, etc. In total, she was actively present in 8 interacting

networks and groups at the time of study and in 10 groups two years prior. Subjective assessments by the grown family members created their family's sociogram – a snapshot of relationships that had been formed over a long time. Without understanding their history, the nature of these relationships could not be fully understood as well. Migration had a substantial impact on the history of relationships and the composition of this family. About 16 years ago, Gulzat's daughters left to work abroad and her house became empty. The widow decided to adopt a boy as she had no sons from her previous two marriages. Having only daughters was difficult for her as, culturally, women had to bear male heirs for their husbands. She adopted a baby boy with assistance from a relative; he had been given up for adoption by his biological mother straight after birth. Her adoption killed two birds with one stone. First, it 'normalised' her status as a good, successful mother of a son and, second, it filled the empty nest. Raising him was not easy: apart from her mother, no relatives helped her; the child was sick, and it took many years to treat his condition by all available means; also, she moved to a different village to keep the adoption secret but found it challenging to adapt to the new place. Her son reached adolescence, his health recovered and, suddenly, the remorseful biological mother found them, disclosing the adoption. The boy went to live with his biological mother, but they could not get along. However, when he re-joined Gulzat, their relationship and communications became very strained. By the time of observation, she had adopted her grandson, who had a delayed intellectual development and a speech defect, from her divorced daughter, who regularly travelled abroad for work. Her adopted son was very jealous; he disliked the little boy who was receiving his mother's love and care; he nostalgically noted he used to be loved and cared like that before[38].

Family B

This family, from a different settlement, could be an example of cooperative and empathetic relationships and values. It only had two people, a couple whose five children (two daughters and three sons) were away. One daughter worked abroad; her siblings studied or worked in the capital or another town in Kyrgyzstan.

The sociogram below show how the family subjectively assessed their relationships: mutual empathy was only between the spouses; they loved their children; women was dedicated to her family almost exclusively; her husband had much more extensive range of interactions: with relatives, especially his younger brother, and fellow villagers, who used his taxi services and goods delivery services (he was especially on good terms with a group of young women, his regular customers).

38. Communications between all family members did not necessarily improved their relationships as will be explaine din the section on communication.



According to her relatives, the woman highly valued education. She stressed that she and her siblings had a higher vocational education. The couple tried to provide their children with the best education against all the odds. All his life, the man regretted his lack of higher professional education, even though he studied in a college and qualified as an agricultural specialist. However, he never worked in this profession: at the time of the study, he was responsible for heating systems and electricity supply (boilerman and electrician) at a school where his wife worked as a headteacher. Their status and behaviour models suggested that the woman was in charge of their household. Though soft and 'obedient-looking, husband was not always like this. According to their acquaintances and relatives, he used to drink and was violent towards his wife and children. Nowadays, the couple seemed to have settled in a harmonious household routine: the woman spent most of her time at her work, had no circle of friends and little communication with her blood relatives as, unlike her siblings, she was raised by her grandparents. She spent free time on household chores and needlework. In contrast, her husband spent less time at work and was more engaged in providing 'taxi' services for fellow villagers. He liked socialising and was often called a 'community activist' for being ready to selflessly help others, especially young women, who then thank him, inviting him 'for tea'.

By local community standards, the couple was long 'supposed' to become grandparents: daughters were over 25 and sons reached a 'marriage' age. Eldest daughter had a 'history', a failed marriage, and preferred to go abroad telling her parents that she would marry only a foreigner. The couple worried about their daughters to the extent that the man opposed the daughter's plans to migrate. As their children did not participate in the survey, their relationships could not be measured, but the couple believed that they all had close bonds with each other.

Family C

This family presents a system of strained solidarity. It had a young married woman, Bermet[39], with her sister-in-law of the same age looking after two girls and two boys, aged one year to 9. Her sister-in-law lived in the household episodically, in between her visits to her elder brother living in the capital. Usually, Bermet's husband and mother-in-law lived there too but, at the time of the study, he was working in Russia, and his mother was staying with her eldest son in the capital. Her mother-in-law was in touch daily on the phone and knew all about family news and watched how children were growing up and how the household was tended to.



Как видно на социограмме, мать имеет наибольшую значимость в отнThis family's sociogram shows that the mother-in-law had the most important place. Bermet appreciated her help in keeping family financially afloat in difficult times (redistributing earnings of the eldest son), emotional support and resolving conflicts in the youngest son's family. Bermet's

39. Not her real name.

husband, being the youngest son, was the formal head of their household, he was commanding, managed family finances and considered himself a rightful household owner. Being persistent and hard-working, he managed to move his family out of the parental house into a temporary construction that he planned to expand into a large house. In practice, her mother-in-law had a strong influence on important family decisions. Her involvement in the family's management carried on as the youngest son could not adequately fulfil his responsibility as a household head due to intermittent employment. Moreover, later, he became addicted to gambling, got into debt that precipitated his migration to Russia.

Bermet's position in the household was ambiguous; she said that her husband walked all over her, and she did not participate in family discussions or decisions. When he stayed at home, he would appropriate the family's low-income benefit of 3,000 soms to spend as he pleased. Practice showed that her mother-in-law walked over her too. Bermet did not know if her husband sent them money and how much. Her mother-in-law received the transfers, paid her son's debts and bought home essentials as she saw fit. At the time of the study, this young woman learned that she would receive payment for providing the field worker with board and accommodation and asked her mother-in-law's permission to buy a semi-automatic washing machine so that they did not have to laundry by hand, especially bedding. The approval was granted. Next day, however, her mother-in-law told Bermet to give the sister-in-law money for dental treatment and spend the remainder on foodstuffs detailing their prices and quantity. Mother-in-law feigned they had no prior agreement on buying a washing machine. The young woman was very disappointed, saying to the fieldworker that she should have bought the washing machine first and informed her mother-in-law later. Still, despite such treatment, Bermet did not consider her mother-in-law a dictator and often expressed her appreciation for being able to live that way with her children. The woman recalled that at one particularly difficult time when her family was on the verge of disintegration and she went back to her parents with her children, it was the mother-in-law who insisted that her husband bring her and their children back.

The sociogram does not reflect the husband's attitudes towards Bermet, as he did not participate in the survey. We could only observe his attempts to control and limit the possible freedoms of his wife strictly. He called her on WhatsApp daily, commenting on her appearance with jealousy, continually scolding her for taking 'liberties' and ordering her what to do and how. In his ideas, a woman should lead a reclusive life and only work in the house.

Bermet herself wanted to lead an active life and be involved in the community. She was a diligent parent, helped children with their homework,

and had an important role in parents' committee at school. At some point, the local religious group tried to involve her in their training and other activities; villagers considered them to be linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Her mother-in-law intervened to stop the group from bothering her.

Bermet's answers provided no information about her relationships with the sister-in-law, even though they shared household work and seemingly supported each other. In the end, the position of the sister-in-law was also vulnerable as she was yet unmarried and already considered to be a spinster in this rural area. The girl did not have stable housing and in practice lived as a dependent of one brother or another. She immersed herself in reproductive household work despite having sewing skills and experience of working as a seamstress.

The sister-in-law expressed a very positive attitude towards Bermet though her behaviour was incongruent. Most likely, Bermet understood that, in the absence of her husband and mother-in-law, the sister-in-law voluntarily or unwittingly performed a supervisory function. The sister-in-law had leverage, sometimes manipulative, on her mother. When the issue of washing machine arose, the sister-in-law could not directly ask Bermet for money for dental treatment and, eventually, their family met her medical needs at the expense of Bermet's need in mechanising domestic labour.

The young woman had no one to share her emotional aspirations and interests in her immediate environment, and therefore, she communicated on matters of interest mainly with her relatives - mother, sisters, etc.

Family D

Among all the sociograms, only the sociogram of the family of Cholpon [40]gave a persuasive example of a close-knit and united family where relations were mutually cordial. The picture had to exclude her husband, who was working abroad and did not participate in the study, though his family worried about him the most. Such strong solidarity could be possibly explained with them being a nuclear family with just female members, mother with two youngest fourth and fifth daughters (15 and 11-year-old). Cholpon's eldest daughter was married and lived with her husband in different Oblast, her second daughter was a labour migrant in Russia too, and the third daughter attended college in the capital.

40. Not her real name.



During the observations, girls freely discuss their daily school activities with the mother, including about an ongoing school conflict. Cholpon always supported her daughters' creative endeavours. All three shared household chores without any difficulties. Cholpon said that her daughters were more like sisters to her. Girls did not regard the mother figure intimidating, even though she often scolded and 'disciplined' them. All three of them were generally warm towards their husband/father, despite his past affair, which was considered by the community as a betrayal. Each family member had different reaction him leaving to live with another woman. Cholpon always tried to reiterate her version of events on the phone to friends and relatives, moving the blame for the breakup from her husband to the other woman, the home wrecker. One daughter, who was working abroad when their father left, started wearing hijab and sought answers in religion. The youngest two were very uncomfortable with a negative portrayal of their father and with any discussion of his behaviour and, generally, avoided mentioning him in their sociometric survey.

Despite all three family members having a wide social circle, their survey answers showed them very dedicated to each other, emotionally interdependent and mutually supportive.

This review of cases does not allow to single out any specific way of migration influenced the nature of intra-family relationships. Configurations of relationships were determined by such other factors as family members' real power, available social and symbolic assets, and the breadth of their social circle in the community.

2.1.4. Communications in the family

Over the past decade, technological changes have fundamentally transformed the way people communicate and perceive social space and distances. Numerous studies show different ways of how new information technologies change the reality of families affected by migration.

Authors of the article on Parenthood in the Age of Mobile Phones [41]stated that low-cost mobile communication made day-to-day phone contact simple which helped some labourers decide to endure life abroad. Migrant parents tried talking to their children on the phone every day to compensate for their physical absence. Parents or spouses used phones to influence behaviours and lives of their migrant children and partners. Where one person dominated in a relationship, mobile communication was used to maintain control as observed in the following household: 'Husband A. makes video calls every morning and evening. Mostly, he talks to A., asks what they were doing, if his mother or brother called. Sometimes he finds fault with her appearance, even her headscarf. He demands she stay away from makeup and bright clothes, etc. He asks her to show children, especially the youngest, asks about their school, etc. This way, they can talk half an hour or more.' Remarkably, the woman in this family did not know her husband's address, details of his life, work and daily routines despite him being abroad over a year. She was only aware of his friend (as they migrated together) and his parents. She also knew about groups for fellow migrants from Kyrgyzstan on social networks. She did not know when her husband would return as he said he would do so after paying off all his debts. The woman did not know how he was paying his debts and the amount he already paid.

In another family, the female head of the household used mobile communication to gather intelligence on the 'inappropriate' behaviour of her youngest daughter-in-law, who was working in Russia. Her daughters and other daughters-in-law called her from Russia and reported every step of the youngest daughter-in-law. On one occasion, the eldest daughter complained about the younger daughter-in-law not reciprocating her already two visits. The head of the household monitored the conduct of her daughter-in-law from a distance to decide whether she could stay abroad or return.

Field observations identified different structures of communications in migrant families.

41. Madianou, M. and Miller, D., Mobile Phone Parenting: Reconfiguring Relationships Between Filipina Migrant Mothers and Their Left-behind Children, 2011 at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/anthropology/sites/anthropology/files/new_media_final_paper.pdf

One structure involved the exclusion of individual family members from communication.

Daughters-in-law were rarely involved in conversations at the dinner table, mostly because they were too busy with household work or childcare to have the opportunity to eat with others. One observation recorded: *'daughter-in-law H.H. talked very little as she cared for small babies and hardly had a moment to sit down with us. Family usually had dinner while she was putting children to bed. Her husband or other relatives brought her dinner to her.' Exclusion of daughters-in-law stemmed from their cultural behaviour model: they should not volunteer their opinions, should respect elders, listen and learn. Most daughters-in-law behaved in line with this model as demonstrated by this observation: 'when the daughter-in-law could sit with us, she restrained herself, rarely joining in with everyone's laughter.'*

Occasionally, families excluded children or elderly from communication. In one household, there was an elderly in a very advanced age with health problems. He lived in his own house; his son took over the responsibility for the house management. The family observer noted the following: 'family displays psychological fatigue. Only U. talks to the grandfather. His son, eldest grandson, or smaller granddaughters do not come even near him'. There were also two families where migrant parents left their children with their grandparents. These children had to listen regularly to nasty comments about their migrant parents, especially if their mother was divorced. Unable to express their opposition to such comments, children would become aggressive, or burst into tears, leave the table and the room in silence.

In another family, there was an exclusion of a grandson, who lived within his grandparents' extended family. Every time the boy tried to start or join a conversation, he was told sharply and rudely that he was not allowed to talk or even pose questions to elders. According to the observation record:

H. (boy) craves attention, he comes to say hello, goodbye, to ask what the researcher is doing, he always looks for an opportunity to talk and spend time with the researcher, asks him to play ball together, follows him everywhere, tries to look after him, bringing water for washing or a towel. It's hard for him to speak his mind. When the researcher attempts to talk to him, the boy finds holding a conversation difficult, because of his inability to express his thoughts. Sometimes the researcher does not understand what the boy says, probably, because the boy thinks he is speaking in Kyrgyz[42].

The grandfather was sharp and strict with him, scolding him often. Once, at the table, H. asked where the salad came from, and the grandfather bluntly told him that it did not matter to him where the salad came from and

42. The boy was from an ethnic Uzbek family who lived in a mono-Uzbek environment.

he should eat in silence. Such abruptness was normal for his grandmother and cousins who were also present at the table but made the boy cringe. The grandfather used the same sharp and rude tone when H. asked to come along for the ride with his cousin. In general, the grandfather was very rude to the grandson, betraying his irritation with the grandson's questions, losing temper and becoming angry. The grandmother said that he had a stricter attitude towards the grandson because he was a 'boy'. Similarly, the boy was excluded from the communication of other children of the household. Children reproduced adults' power hierarchies and excluded someone from communication.

Also, certain aspects of communicational exclusion were related to a presence/absence of the speaker's power. So, only those with a power potential had the 'right to talk' about specific household and economic activities. In one family, father and his two sons worked in agriculture and used cars repairs/trade together. It was customary to consult with the eldest son who had worked abroad and helped his family improve their living standards: with his remittances, they bought the house, a car, and agricultural equipment (tractor). The younger son had not made a visible contribution to the extended family's economy, despite working for the family as much as his older brother. Family observation noted the following:

'A. (father) is very close to his sons, they spend a lot of time together, working or sometimes just chatting. They talk mainly about business, for example, discussing where to buy seeds, how much a car is worth. On one occasion, the father wanted to sell the car for USD 4,200. Although the eldest son suggested no less than USD 4,500, he eventually agreed with his father's arguments. On Sunday, the eldest son went to the market to sell the car and got 'greedy' as he had the opportunity to sell the car for USD 4,200, but he turned it down. Later, in the evening, he ruminated a lot and regretted not following his father's advice. By the way, the youngest son does not interfere in such financial matters, and he only listens without giving his opinion, despite being well versed in cars – he trades on the market and knows market prices. In general, all the big decisions about buying and selling are made by the father A., in consultation with the eldest son. It was not always the case, tells the eldest son. His father began listening to him after his first trip to Finland when the son earned almost half a million soms in six months. He came back, saw a cheap 'Kamaz' (truck) and, after consulting with his father, bought it. He also bought a car, broken Honda, in instalments and repaired it for his father. This earned him his father's respect, who started consulting with him.

In another family, the mother and eldest son did not involve the father of the family or even inform him when deciding on important economic and

social matters. The father was usually just informed about final decisions. This communicational exclusion took place because the father was not able to earn money for many years. First, the mother took over the breadwinner's function, then the eldest son.

Another structure of communication in the family involved a non-linear, staggered communication through informational 'brokers', a role often played by the mother of the family. Migrants abroad tended to contact one person, usually their mothers. A 'broker' would convey a truncated version of the conversation with a migrant relative to selected family members. Often a 'broker' involved other family members, especially young children if their parents called. Fathers tended to receive especially condensed information. In many families, differences in access to information coincided with variations in technical capabilities of family members. Fathers often had old button phones, and they did not have WhatsApp to call their children or receive direct calls. Often 'broker' mothers shared the content of phone conversations with migrant children in passing or forget to mention it at all. As a rule, the migrant family member bought modern smartphones with WhatsApp or Skype to a relative who would become a broker. None of the observed families had fathers as 'brokers'.

Mothers' role of a 'broker' also influenced how migrant workers and their children stayed in touch. In many families, children usually ran away during calls, not wanting to talk to their parents who had left them behind. Commonly, that reflected their grandmothers' discouragement, by word or deed, of close emotional contact of separated children and parents. Grandparents raising grandchildren often thought that children's avoidance of their parents was rational as an attempt to protect themselves emotionally as conversations with parents would inevitably end. Also, the 'abstinence' from emotional contact online conformed to what grandparents believed to be local cultural standards. These standards discouraged parents from showing their 'parenthood' and affection to their children in the presence of grandparents. Finally, the lack of direct emotional contact between migrants and their children left behind seemed to many guardians as a natural price for their caring work, their recognition as substitute parents. Children adapted to this wide range of feelings and relationships and, despite having emotional contradictions, tried to follow the unspoken attitudes. Grandmothers often said out loud that migrant parents had been offended by their children's behaviour and blamed grandmothers, but children grew distant from parents they could not see. An observation in one family noted how a five-year-old child avoided his parents: 'When parents call from Yekaterinburg, he refuses point blank to talk to them, turns away from the screen and stays silent. His parents think his grandmother set him against them.'

Field observations registered uneven flows and poor quality of communication between different family members:

- In an extended family, a young couple had little or no opportunity to talk, except to exchange functional information[43]. Talking in plain sight of the parents meant violating cultural regulations. The couple had no allocated space and time for effective communication, except for the limited time they had for sleep. Family observation noted the following: 'The eldest son of the family and his wife did not communicate often. They were busy caring for their babies. When her husband did childcare, she did housework. They didn't cross paths that often. She did not share her news with him. When answering a survey question about a person to ask for money, she told the observer with uncertainty or shyness that she did not ask money from her husband, only from her relatives, such as her sister, who worked in Russia.'
- Communication between parents and children was often limited to household topics. Most families rarely asked children about their interests and aspirations or tried to find out what prevented children from following the elder's advice. Even if parents loved their children very deeply, they still would not attempt an open conversation or seek children's opinions. Parents' lack of communication with their children about important issues often gave rise to conflicts with teenage children. In one family, one boy ran away from home after a disagreement with his mother about house duties and lived with his uncle for some days. In reconciliation, his mother bought him a racehorse, upon the uncle's recommendation to support his interest in a national sports game 'Kok Boru'. She was disappointed again as her son did not look after the horse, kept running away from home and, using his mother's name, borrowed already trained horses to participate in the game. Their conflict intensified, and mother's usual rant about his thanklessness for her many sacrifices lengthened by one new item - a racehorse.

During the participant observation, family members filled out sociometric questionnaires that, among other things, measured their communication. Their answers to the Question 2 (Who do you share your experiences and secrets with?) and Question 6 (Who do you usually share the news with?) are presented below in the form of sociograms.

43. Directed to the execution of specific household tasks. For instance, one person says that cows are already in the shed implying that they need to be milked; or she can say that the wood burns slowly or too fast indicating the need for corrective action.

One household had nine members: father of the house, mother of the house, their son with wife and their four children, and, lastly, the grandson from their daughter who worked abroad. According to Question 2, parents and their son actively shared their experiences and secrets; their daughter-in-law was less involved in communication through her husband and spent more time in contact with her mother. No one mentioned five children as communication actors, possibly, due to their young age.



Question 6 on news exchange showed a more extensive network of relationships: the mother included, in addition to her son and husband, her relatives and friends; the father was an active communicator; their daughter-in-law actively exchanged news with her relatives; and only in case of the son, the communication was limited to just family. Once again, small children were not mentioned.



In another family, the communication scheme showed uneven communication between its members: the son mainly shares his secrets and experiences with his mother and his friend; the daughter communicates with the mother but frugally, preferring to share secrets with friends. The mother did not support cordial communication with children or others; she was very restrained and described by others as a very reserved person. Interestingly, the absent family members, who were in migration such as the eldest son and daughter-in-law, were not mentioned by anyone as their confidante.



Answering the question about news exchange, the same family presented the following configuration of relationships: the mother discussed news with her late husband's sister-in-law (despite her widowhood, the mother was in close touch with the deceased husband's family, especially because of her father-in-law's severe illness); the daughter had friends as well as paternal and maternal relatives; and the youngest son shared news with friends and older brother, though infrequently. The daughter assessed communication with her mother as irregular, while the son and the mother defined their communication as stable, constant and complete.



The lack of stable communication and practices of articulating feelings and thoughts about life situations had negative consequences as family members did not learn or develop effective communicational skills. It also led to conflicts and aggression among the family members. One such conflict was observed between a migrant parent and a child left behind in a small southern town:

H., the head of a non-governmental organisation, and volunteers tried to hold an event 'I love you, Mama' to mark the International Women's Day on 8 March. Volunteers, who were schoolchildren aged 14 and over, had to phone their mothers and express their love. Many did not dare, out of embarrassment, because an open expression of feelings in the family was not customary. One boy categorically refused to participate, stating that he hated his mother for being abroad for too long. He had been living with relatives since childhood and found it difficult to survive. The boy could not come to terms with his mother's decision to earn a living through migration. He was confident that money could be earned in our country, though a small amount, and staying together as a family was important.

Studying family photos and reconstructing family history could shed light on family communication and the quality of its nature and modes. This exercise identified the following:

Photo albums, which had been so popular in the past[44], sunk into oblivion and families no longer had a systematic way to record the history of their family and essential networks. On the one hand, this was the result of digital innovation when people started storing photos in mobile phones, tablets and other devices. Often these masses of photos stayed unclaimed and got

44. During the Soviet era, photo albums were an institutional component of family development. Many social structures helped to fill them up and document family's history: the military always provided army albums, schools and educational establishments institutes provided annual class photos, students individual portraits and the mandatory graduation albums, etc.

lost. They were more likely to remain private, unlike the photo albums in the olden times which were proudly shown to every guest stepping inside the family home. On the other hand, people stopped using photos for documenting family milestones on religious grounds. Some respondents confirmed that photos were banned in their houses (they believed angels did not enter homes with portraits of people; they did not allow taking pictures of themselves, their cattle, equipment thinking that photos would attract evil eye) and old photo albums were burned or got lost.

Most families seemed to lose, along with physical photos, a way to impart the knowledge about family history and significant events on to their children and new family members. When hosts agreed to show field workers their family photos, it appeared that children in the household saw these photos almost for the first time, knew nothing about photographed events or the significance of the people in the pictures. In one family, a teenage granddaughter keenly perused photos of relatives and could not recognise her grandfather as she did not see him alive. In another family, the host, who was a local imam, agreed to show and talk about his army photos (supposedly the only remaining pictures in the family). He discovered with disgust that the background of his discharge photo had an Orthodox Church – he was stationed in a Russian city. He wanted to destroy the photo immediately. As it turned out, the picture was glued to the album so solidly that removing it would have damaged the whole album.

Interestingly, almost all younger people had no 'legends' and stories about the formation of their families, while the older generation had plenty to share. Sometimes, though, a story could take a new form when told by a different family member. Discrepancies could in factual detail. In one family, originally from Tajikistan, who had also moved from one Kyrgyz Oblast to another, people had different memories about when and where their children were born and about the time scale and the composition of family migration.

The analysis of photo histories could not provide an entirely objective and representative data. Nonetheless, it showed that photos with colleagues or extended family, taken on special 'occasions' but still spontaneous, gave way to more personalised and staged photos of family members. Archives of the photos told a history of individual lives rather the collective history of the whole family.

Thus, the study of communication in the family led us to conclude the following:

- Innovations in information technology had a mixed effect on communication in the family. On the one hand, internet and mobile phone communication helped alleviate the emotional pain of

separations, especially for children and migrant parents. On the other hand, the rise of digital photography helped create separate life stories of individuals, dissolving the collective history of their family as documented by traditional photo albums;

- Migration did not have a determining influence on the nature of communication in the family. Traditional cultural roles and attitudes towards different family roles had significant importance for communicational inclusion and exclusion of individual family members;
- Despite the formal inclusion of the whole family in day-to-day communication, some members could take part in only functional household (imperative) conversations. Children, daughters-in-law, elderly were usually excluded from the communication requiring equality in family positions.

2.2. Home as a Monument to Family

The meaning of home is universal in culture and history and combines ideas of traditions, security, emotional warmth, a defended and blessed space. Lotman calls home as a symbolic space, an iconic element of the cultural space[45].

As a place for a happy life, recognition, understanding, human warmth and support, home is the opposite of foreign land[46], glorified by migrant workers through poems, songs, blogosphere. Abashin notes that the themes of 'homeland' and 'home' were key in the narratives of Central Asian migrant workers who linked to them not only by their origins, but also by all their worries, relationships, and plans of return someday. The idea of return, even if was 'sometime in the future', encapsulated the whole meaning of migrants' life, justifying the struggles and humiliations and visualising possible rewards and achievements[47].

In social sciences, one's residence, home, is a social marker: it helps de-coding other people, reflects one's lifestyle, and normative behaviour and habits. In his concept of habitus, a the famous sociologist Pierre Bourdier points to the interconnection of habitat and habitus , explaining: 'habitus is defined as a set of acquired dispositions, that create and organise everyday practices where 'a sense of one's place' and 'a sense of the other's place' co-exist[48].

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45. Lotman Yu., Inside thinking worlds: House in 'Master and Margarita', Semiosfera. St Petersburg, Iskusstvo-SPB, 2004.
46. Malahov, B., et al, Творчество мигрантов как проблема социологии культуры, at: http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2018/3/tvorchestvo-migrantov-kak-problema-sociologii-kultury-vyhodcy-i.html
47. S. Abashin, Возвращение мигрантов домой: перспективы антропологического изучения, Ethnographic Review, 2017. № 3. С. 5–15 http://journal.iea.ras.ru/archive/2010s/2017/no3/005.htm
48. Указ. ист , стр. 64

This link between one's habitat and habitus is well illustrated by housing choices of labour migrants: studies on the 'housing choices[49] of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan identified various rationales in migrants' selection of housing option in Moscow that ranged from renting a bed to becoming a 'host', a responsible tenant with corresponding life practices - from finding a place to sleep with maximum distance from others to finding a residence to 'settling down', creating a place of residence with emotional support, 'symbiotic[50]' connections and a degree of freedom in choosing lifestyle (recuperation routine, house rules, etc.).

In the life strategies of migrant workers in our study, the concept of home takes central place:

- Focus group respondents explained their **rationale of migration as a need to earn money to build their own house, considering it to be an essential attribute of a family:** 'They want to build a house, buy cattle. They leave to earn a living and buy what they need. Who would go abroad if everything is fine here?[51]; 'In Kyrgyzstan, one's salary is not enough to build a house or marry, that is why they are forced to leave'[52]; 'It is the lack of means. Younger generation no longer receives land allocations; there is not enough land. They have no livestock. Young people still need to feed their families. They leave to build a house or buy a car; it depends.[53]'
- Focus groups regarded the house as **measure of a migrant's success:** 'here is a person who worked hard for 5 or 6 years, built a house here, bought a car, opened a shop, started a business'[54]; 'Guys who left at the time when I started my business, have succeeded. They left with their families to work in Russia, returned, built a two-storey house, bought a two-room apartment in Bishkek, started driving an expensive car. The difference is big; they are better off. I built this shop in 2005, at first business did well, but then there was no further progress. Economy is not developing. It's profitable to work in Russia, so one can build a house'[55].
- In focus groups and interviews, respondents found that, in comparison with the generation of fathers, **the younger generation was more independent and mature since they were determined to buy/improve a house:** 'nowadays, many people think they need

49. Rocheva, A., Исследование позиций «карьеры квартиросъемщика» и моделей проживания в Москве мигрантов из Киргизии и Узбекистана, Journal of Sociology, 2015, Vol.21(2) at http://jour.isras.ru/index.php/socjour/article/view/1319/2917
50. Complementary and mutually useful connections
51. Settlement 4 – older men
52. Settlement 7 – older women
53. Settlement 6 - young men focus group
54. Settlement 6 – older men
55. Settlement 4 – older men

to get financially stable first and get married afterwards: build a house, buy a car... Our generation waited for fathers to build us a house. Current youth are independent'[56]; 'before, young people had no problems with money, did not have to worry about building a house with parents providing them with everything. Now even a school child wants to earn money and make home improvements' [57].

Home was a supreme value, encapsulating all attributes required to have a prosperous family life. To acquire this value, people made significant sacrifices. They got loans then struggled with debts multiplying every year, 'kept' their lives on the backburner until they finish building the house, sold off valuable livestock, and, eventually, migrated to find work abroad.

Understandably, the public discourse treated migrants' aspirations to build houses in a positive light: studies based on the developmental logic found the migrants' housebuilding among most obvious positive effects of migration and principal life investment.

Public consciousness also regarded housebuilding as a positive outcome of a 'successful career' of a migrant labourer. In local communities, young people's migration was legitimised by the need to 'earn for a house'. As soon as families receive the remittances, the critical expenditure was building, buying or renovating a house.

Muktarbek kyzy A. et el wrote in the article, Impact of Remittances on Household Spending Patterns in the Kyrgyz Republic,[58] that individual housebuilding was one of the key ways for using received remittances.

Migrants needed at least five years to save enough money for housebuilding. These years abroad they had to put up with any conditions: renting a bed in the overcrowded 'elastic' apartments, living in inhabitable spaces nearer work, being always on the move, changing from one habitat to another to follow jobs. According to 2018 study of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia, conducted by the Russian Centre for Migration Studies and the Tian Shan Analytical Center, only 2% of respondents said they had owned property with 7% (mostly men) living at places of work (construction sites, markets, etc.) and the rest renting apartments.

Abashin notes that high mobility (changes of workplace, place of residence) and a peculiar state of non-attachment to space were the outcomes of organising everyday life while in labour migration in a specific, temporary, not real – way. To a certain degree, this is an adaptation strategy to mitigate ever-present threats of deportation, falling ill or losing a job

56. Settlement 7 – older women
57. Settlement 7 – older women
58. Muktarbek, A., Seiyitov, CH., Jenish, N., Влияние денежных переводов на структуру расходов домохозяйств в Кыргызской Республике, Economic Research Centre of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, No.2, 2015.

and having to go back home. Having a family (spouse, children, parents) back home plays an important role, creating a force of attraction to their homeland and home[59].

All studied settlements had newly built houses (often two-storey) awaiting their owners. Owner's relatives occupied them or lived nearby. Occasionally, houses were occupied by paying tenants even in the early stage of construction. When asked about the owner's return, respondents stated with conviction that 'they will come back', in some uncertain future. Some respondents also wondered why the owners (or one of them) had not returned yet. One female respondent in Jalal-Abad talked with sadness about her sister, a long-term migrant[60] who kept finding reasons to migrate despite buying land, finishing the house and having to leave her husband and children who had grown into adults in her absence:

Of course, nothing compares to your home, wherever you are. Nothing could be better than living with your children and husband. Then there was no choice, so she left to earn money. Now we are ok and tell her to stay, and that I've had enough, I've helped to raise the children, but I can't help anymore... she could not find a job her, and so she wanted to migrate again saying: that they need to support the children. Her husband's salary is small (laughter). So, we don't' let her go and say that it is time for her to stay put. We say we can't fill in her absence anymore. It would be better if she finds a job here and lives with her children. It would be very helpful if she can do it. So, she says that she is leaving and we respond that we can't look after her children. She bought land, built a house extension, did the repairs. She says that now we need to pay for children's tuition, we need to educate them[61].

This case illustrates that coming back to the place of dreams and the future, which caused the migration in the first place, was far from simple and obvious.

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59. Abashin, S., Возвращение домой и циркулярная мобильность: как кризисы меняют антропологический взгляд на миграцию, Ethnographic Review, 2017. No. 3., pp 5–15 | ISSN 0869-5415, http://journal.iea.ras.ru

60. Interview transcripts from the study, Gender In the Eyes of the society, interview with a migrants' sister in Jalal-Abad.

61. P: Эми (ыы) (ушкуруп) :: конечно озунун уйуно жетпейтта, кайсыл жерде болсо делечи, бала-чакасы менен баардыгы бирге жашаса жакшы меспи, эми а:йласы жоктон барып, (ыы) акча иштеп келгени ле кеткен, анан азыр жакшы эми, барба деп атабыз, эми мен болду балдары чонойду мен караша албайм...

... Азыр, азыркы убакта да, иши жок болуп калды, "дагы кетем" - деген ойлору пайда болуп кеттат, "балдарды багыш керек" - деп куйосунун айлыгы болсо (аа) (смеётся) азыраак, ошонучун ушу кетирбей: - "бир жерге жайгаштырып, (поправила) жайгаш" - деп атабыз. Эми, биз деле "каралашалбайбыз, каралаша албайтабыз" - деп. Эми жакшы болмок ушеерде иштеп, ушеерде озунун балдары менен чогуу жашап, ушинтип журсо, жакшы болот эле. Эми, "кетем" – деп, биз анан: - "биз кара албайбыз" - деп атабыз. Азыркы убакта, чек алып, уйлорун жакшы эле чонойтуп, ремонтторду кылып алган, эми дагын контракт толош керек, балдарды окутуш керек деп.

There were also cases where, after parental divorce, only a part of the family lived in a house that was built on remittances. Sometimes, one of the spouses was no longer in touch after spending many years working abroad or found a new partner. Other times, people divorced because they no longer got along as their relationship and values changed while abroad[62]. Focus group from Settlement 3 shared a story of a young woman who married a migrant when she was 17 years old. The woman had lived with her parents-in-law for almost six years. She cared for the bull-calves that were bought with remittances, prepared food for workers who were constructing a house for her family, did all the household chores and looked after in-laws. Her husband visited home only two times, and after each of his short stays, the woman had a child. The house was completed; her husband returned for the occasion and evicted the woman and their three children. She had to seek help from the leader of the mahalla and the women's council of the village. As it turned out, her husband told her he could not live with her as she smelled like cattle and looked aged. The women leaders from the mahalla committee and the women's council appealed to her parents-in-law to protect the interests of their grandchildren. Eventually, family 'reached a consensus' and the woman and children went to live in her husband's old house (as his parents moved into a new house located on the same plot of land), her husband went abroad again, affirming his decision to marry another woman.

Sometimes, couplesd divorced before they could finish the house and the unfinished building became a symbol of a broken family. A female respondent in Kyzyl Kiya shared how her dreams of a family home changed when her husband left her and their children. They had laid a cement foundation for their new house near where they lived, but it remained unbuilt. The woman hoped that her son would finish building the house that she initially wanted to make with her husband. Her son finished school and migrated to Russia for work. She said she 'lost interest in homemaking'. She no longer 'embroidered beautiful pillows for a new place as her desire and patience dissipated'. The family flat was kept clean and comfortable by her daughter, whose husband was working abroad and saving money for their own house. Her daughter grew flowers, swept the yard, cleaned water canals, cooked and tidied the flat. Though, from time to time, her father-in-law came to bring her to their house so she could help with the household chores. The girl said she was tired of working in two families, not having a home of her own. All her dreams were about her future home, which she planned to decorate tastefully, make it cosy and warm for herself, her husband and children.

62. Usually, a migrant spouse is the initiator of the separation. The respondents were women.

In another example, a female respondent from Settlement 6 said that for a very long time, she and her husband had been improving they house they inherited from her deceased father-in-law, and she had been helping her husband with transferring house deeds transfer from the deceased's name to her husband's. Then her husband migrated and abandoned his wife and daughters. She stopped the house re-registration process as he 'committed evil' and she no longer cared about what would happen.

A third family, seemingly, had a 'happy end'. A female respondent with her husband earned enough for a house, a car, and some savings and, very importantly, found jobs when back home. The respondent said: 'We did not think life in our new house would be like this. I thought that children and we would be happy to live together and be in close touch with our relatives.' After over ten years in Russia, her children who had been staying with their grandparents, grew up not the way the parents had expected. They also had not expected to have daily conflicts with children and misunderstandings with relatives. The respondent said she and her husband often had nostalgia for their migrant life: 'It seems now that we were happy there. We always want to go back to Russia. We don't know how to move on.'

And in the end, a story about family housebuilding in a southern region. One of the daughters of an elderly couple's daughter had to return to parental home with her children. Her marriage broke down, and they got evicted by her husband. After leaving her daughters in her grandparents' care, the woman almost immediately migrated to Russia. With her remittances, her father built a small house with two large rooms in the yard. Girls were not allowed to enter or take anything from that house. During the observation, eldest granddaughter kept arranging fruit in vases in the new house, to 'make it smell good'. The fieldworker noted that the house treated as a museum; it was brand new, clean and under lock and key. No one lived there.

As far as it was possible to judge, the woman had slim prospects of return and reintegration in the community. Also, the family clearly articulated that the parental house with all the assets would be inherited by her nephew, a son from the eldest daughter, who had been adopted by his grandparents.

Thus, the dreams of a house being a good and happy end to living through hardships in migration turned into sad stories with silent and empty new mansions standing as monuments to broken families and as a physical embodiment of dreams about happy family life.

One female respondent in Osh ruminated about the house had been built in her father's native village, as per tradition. But no one lived there: she had to rent accommodation in Osh where she found work, her brother worked and rented accommodation in Bishkek, and their parents still worked in

Russia, and no one knew when they would return. They could not visit the two-storey house, built in the village, even once a year. 'It would have been better to buy an apartment in Bishkek or Osh, so my brother and I could have lived in our own place. ... We are neither there nor here – having no home anywhere, as if we have no family. I ask my mother: "if I get married, where are you going to host in-laws?"'

According to one group of respondents, many migrants invested in buying or building a house/ apartment, not in their small village, but large cities - in Osh or Bishkek. Many respondents talked about buying apartments in Russia on top of buying a house at home. Thus, we can talk about the formation of a practice of family living in transience - between different homes (where the type of dwelling and its cultural environment differ significantly dictating their owners/tenant's different behavioural models) or between spaces with no homes.

RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the dynamics of the migration strategies of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic, the impact of external migration on family roles, regimes and practices, the dominant models of relationships within society and religious practices of the population allowed to formulate the following main conclusions.

ON COMMUNITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

- The image of migration constructed in communities is a predominantly negative phenomenon to be avoided. Respondents have an especially negative view of female labour migration which is interpreted through the risks lens of a perceived risk of moral corruption and damage to national dignity. Achievements of migrants are judged only through their material wealth with such judgement are then reinforced by the media's anti-migrant discourse directed against the poor.
- Initial look at the data shows opposite seemingly contradictory approaches in the articulation of migration as 'dangerous' and 'undesirable': 1) the apparent anti-migrant approach that contrasts migrants 'running away' from poverty with their 'successful' villagers who were able to prosper at home and, thus, contributing to the stigma of poor people; 2) an approach that seems to justify the inevitability of labour migration with pragmatic benefits of migration strategies and influences the formation of high economic expectations of migrant workers. Still, in this second approach, the female emancipation, changes in the roles of men and women in the family, and changes in the practices of interactions between children and parents are regarded as absolute evilnegative.
- Different elite groups fighting for power resources in society appear to have consensus about anti-migrant discourse. Making statements about the role of religion and criminal structures in communities supports an anti-migrant discourse and the foundation for the legitimisation of the power of certain groups in society.
- The existence of a critical mass of the indebted, the mediatised, and the securitised (new formats/figures of subjectivity) whose civil and political rights are appropriated by small competing groups of local elites who 'represent' vast masses of migrant population, forms the essence of the realities of the pilot communities in Kyrgyzstan. New figures of subjectivity do not yet save poor, marginalised migrants from the actions of power structures, do not allow breaking out of the double trap of anti-migrant discourse and discourse of universal

consumption. Captured by these dependencies, the poor continue to produce old products, maintain outdated power regimes and relationships. This includes building houses that neither harmonise family relations nor increase the collective capital of the community.

ON FAMILY IN THE CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

- The modern Kyrgyz family is in transition: (a) conducting a critical conversion from a system where a paternalistic state provided for essential needs in exchange for recognition and adoption of normative behavioural strategies by family members; b) transitioning to a system where each family must meet its own needs and requirements without relying on the state's social institutions. This transition has led to a crisis of family as a social institution, unable to adapt on time to its new environment, to develop sources of provision for the family's vital functions, and to prevent the loss of positive emotional connections of the family members. This also led to an increase in domestic violence.
- Family and marriage as an institution, against the backdrop of a declining role of the state, plays a crucial role in reproducing patriarchal values: reverence, obedience, subordination to elders and husband. However, the actual gender order, as opposed to the rhetorical (in which older male is a breadwinner, the head of the household, making all the important family decisions) does not present an unambiguous male dominance.
- Religious practices influence the (re)distribution of power within the family; the 'normalisation' of new role standards of femininity and motherhood; and the dissemination of men's domination and control of and violence against women, especially among the younger generation, on religious grounds.
- Migration appears to be one of the tools to meet the challenges of the absent socio-economic support for families, the dysfunctionality of social institutions or change in their functionality. However, migration is often mistakenly treated as the reason for the family institution being in crisis.
- The family status predetermines a person's migration opportunities and strategies. This is particularly evident in the context of an extended family: family encourages and educates the younger generation in its migration strategy, viewing it as without alternative and mandatory.
- The modern family, against the background of migration, has

changed its role models of behaviours and expectations: children from childhood begin to acquire the role of earners and breadwinners of the family. Migration offers broad opportunities for this: the departure of a son presents a chance to delay property transfer for his relatively young parents, the possibility for him to 'correct' character flaws and behaviour, the possibility of transferring the roles of earners and breadwinners, and a 'window of opportunity' for people living below the poverty line to approach the media-advertised consumption standards. The departure of a daughter can bring an opportunity to maximize the benefits of giving birth to and raising a girl before she marries, a chance to 'exonerate' those women who did not marry 'on time', who divorced and became widows, and a possibility to transferring the role of earners and breadwinners of the family.

- In the meantime, the results of the research don't identify a specific determining factor of family migration influencing the nature of internal family relationships and communication. The configurations of relationships are determined by other factors: who has power in the family, family's social and symbolic capitals, and the breadth of its social network the community.
- The development of information technology affects communication in the family in contradictory ways. On the one hand, Internet communication and mobile phones can mitigate emotional pain of the separation of family members, especially of children and their migrant parents. On the other hand, the massive spread of digital photography technologies enables the formation of individual life stories of each family member, destroying collective history previously documented through family photo albums.
- The concept of House takes the central place in the life strategies of labour migrants (regardless of gender). However, dreams of a home, which seem like a good and happy ending following a life of hardship in migration, in practice become sad stories about the mansions built by labour migrants that stand empty because of the broken communication and connections with family.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the research of changes within families and communities in the context of migration, as well as of changes in migration policies in the Kyrgyz Republic and in the media discourse of migration, we formulated the recommendations to the key stakeholders.

To government institutions:

- Migration policy should be comprehensive, based on the interests and needs of labour migrants and their families;
- Government migration policy should primarily focus on the establishment and development of mechanisms to protect the rights of labour migrants across state borders. At the same time, government policies should address all different violations of the rights of labour migrants and their corresponding protection not on a piecemeal basis but through promoting collective protection mechanisms;
- The relevant government agency responsible for labour migration should represent migrant workers during negotiations on the procedures to regulate migration within the Eurasian Economic Union;
- For this purpose, it is expedient for the government authorities to strengthen their cooperation with associations and trade unions working to protect interests of migrant workers, to promote practices of protection of the rights of transnational migrant workers;
- In order to reduce the negative impact of an anti-migrant discourse and the stigmatisation of migrants from poor families, it is expedient to develop rights-based training modules on migrants' rights, such as, for example, health issues, housing or education, and protection form labour exploitation[63], and integrating labour migration as part of the globalised development. Such training modules should be part of a compulsory course in humanities (such as People and Society) in the curriculum for schools, primary and secondary vocational education institutions;
- The government should formulate in a more concrete way the objectives of the migration policy for the state and public media institutions to reduce the discrimination against and stigma about migrants, regardless of their gender, age, nationality or faith.

63. https://ijrcenter.org/thematic-research-guides/immigration-migrants-rights/#Permissible_Restrictions_on_Migrants8217_Human_Rights

To international organisations and civil society institutions, including media organisations:

- Review the key definitions of vulnerability and risks within the processes of migration and radicalisation;
- Support the establishment of a rights-based discourse on migration, and to address the violations of migrant's human rights on the level of transnational relations between states and other stakeholders on migration;
- It is expedient to establish and promote informational platforms about history, migration policy (in the format of Liven. Living Asia - Internews);
- Promote images of successful migration strategies that not only contribute to the material wealth of families and communities, but also to the development of human potential, broadening opportunities and capitals of labour migrants.

To research structures and academia:

- Facilitate research into the protection of the rights of transnational labour migrants, with the application of interdisciplinary and legal approaches and focus on monitoring the violations of migrant workers' rights in the national media discourse;
- Ensure research data and reports on migration studies are widely disseminated. Particular attention should be paid to research based on evidence about the presence/absence of connections between migration and risks of radicalisation and extremism.

Appendix 1:

Table of desktop review literature on main areas of various aspects of migration processes.

Author	Title	Empirical base or illustration	Theoretical contribution / main conclusions
3. Methodology of studying migration processes in Central Asia			
Sergei Abashin	'Возвращение мигрантов домой: перспективы антропологического изучения' [Migrants' return: anthropological perspectives]], Ethnographic Review, Vol.3, 2017, pp. 5-15; http://journal.iea.ras.ru/archive/2010s/2017/no3/005.htm	Literature review Discourse analysis	Migration presents a diverse set of patterns of behaviour, both linear - back and forth, cyclical (with varying cycle's durations), where the return is often not the end of a migration cycle. Understanding return migration as a part of a circular system of socio-economic relations and exchanges that facilitate the reintegration of migrants upon the transfer of knowledge, information and membership.
Jørgen Carling and Francis Collins	'Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2017, p.3.	Literature review	Alternative agenda for understanding the motives for migration. Highlighting two main research approaches: 1) transnational approach that analyses different configurations of migrants' integration into transnational social circles/networks/fields outside of 'sending' or 'receiving' state definition of migrants – 'migration extends across borders, in transnational social and economic ties.' 2) feminist approach as an attempt to analyse migration as embedded in a multitude of power relations and an opportunity to view how migration-related aspirations correlate with gender social norms and expectations, including caring and other obligations.
S.Jolly, H.Reeves	Gender and Migration. An Overview Report. Bridge, The Cutting Edge Pack, 2005		Convention, relativity of categories of "forced" and "voluntary" migration

Speranta Dimitru	From 'brain drain' to 'care drain': Women's labour migration and methodological sexism. Women's Studies International Forum Volume 47, Part B, November–December 2014, Pages 203-212//	Case study based on secondary data (research of female labour migration)	The construction (definition) of women's labour migration through the concepts of 'care drain' in parallel with 'brain drain' is seen as a methodological sexism, based on three criteria: (i) women are studied only as carers ('nurses'); those surveyed as carers are only women (men are not considered); and (iii) women's inability to fulfil their traditional family roles is assessed negatively or with regret.
4. Migration and radicalisation			
Search for Common Ground	Results of baseline research about religious and violent extremism in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), 2015; http://prevention.kg/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Results-of-baseline-research-Central-Asia_2015_Eng.pdf	Baseline research based on a survey of expert community in Central Asia about factors of radicalisation of different population groups and perspectives of countering violent extremism	Main three findings, according to the study's terms and conditions: 1. Ineffective communication of civil society and state authorities, among 'jamaats', religious representatives and law enforcement officials, security services at the local level; 2. Women and youth are the main target group of religious extremist propaganda. External and internal factors of radicalisation of this group; 3. The most effective tool in preventing the spread of violent extremism among young people is the use of cyber resources such as the Internet and social networks; 4. Radicalisation and spread of violent extremism among prison inmates is a common enemy of the State represented by law enforcement agencies; limited resources (material, human) for preventing the spread of extremism in prisons and carrying out the necessary rehabilitation work among prisoners.

FIDH, Anti-Discrimination Centre 'Memorial', Bir-Diuino-Kyrgyzstan	Women and Children from Kyrgyzstan Affected by Migration: an Exacerbated Vulnerability, 2016, https://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/343821?download=true	The report was based on the findings of a six-day fact-finding mission in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek and Osh oblasts) and a fact-finding mission in southern Kazakhstan in March 2016. The study aims to analyse the situation of women and children involved in migration processes, as well as to identify main human rights violations faced by Kyrgyz migrants and their families.	The report uses the term 'double vulnerability' - the risk of violation of women's and children's rights is assessed as very high, because this group is generally vulnerable, and their vulnerability is exacerbated when they become migrants and maybe are subject to multiple forms of discrimination (psychological, physical and sexual violence or ill-treatment, labour or sexual exploitation, restriction of access to medical, educational, legal, and justice services).
Lira Sagynbekova. University of Central Asia	nternational Labour Migration in the context of Eurasian Economic Union: Issues and Challenges of Kyrgyz Migrants in Russia, Working Paper No.39, UCA, 2017 https://www.ucentralasia.org/Content/Downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP-39%20International%20Labour%20Migration%20in.pdf	Literature review. A survey was conducted among 50 migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow in February 2016 (about 32% of all Kyrgyz migrants work in Moscow). The selection was carried out by the method of snowball. In-depth interviews with key informants were also conducted.	Three groups of respondents: 1) migrant workers who came to Russia before Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU and worked in Moscow for an extended period; 2) migrant workers who arrived in Moscow after joining the EAEU, but who had previous experience of living/working in Russia; 3) 'new' migrants who have recently arrived in Moscow.
Search for Common Ground, Royal United Services Institute of Great Britain (RUSI), Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS)	Causes and Motives of Radicalisation Among Central Asian Labour Migrants in the Russian Federation, Joint Research, 2017: At: https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/KGZ-country-report_CA-radicalization_Eng_24042018.pdf	A joint research project (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and RUSI). Data collection (individual interviews, group discussions, literature and statistics review of the Russian Federation) was conducted seven federal districts in Russia. A total of 218 respondents participated in the study, 34 of them women.	The following factors influencing radicalisation of individual migrants are used to analyse the data: - Different incentives (adventure, sense of belonging, status, material interest, expectations in the afterlife), -Structural motives (environment - repression, corruption, unemployment, social inequality, discrimination, hostility to specific groups), - Favourable factors include the presence of 'radical' mentors, access to 'radical' online communities, networks, weapons, lack of state influence and lack of family support. - Resilience is the ability of people, groups, communities to refute, challenge terrorist and violent ideas and appeals.

UN Women, Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci, and Chinara Esengul.	Women and Violent Extremism in Europe and Central Asia. The Roles of Women in Supporting, Joining, Intervening in, and Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan, 2017 http://eca.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/10/women-and-violent-extremism-in-europe-and-central-asia	Data collection was conducted in Bishkek, Osh, Jalal-Abad and Issyk-Kul regions in November-December 2016. Interviews with representatives of state sector, NGOs, civic organisations, religious leaders, judges, students, etc. and with neighbours of those Kyrgyz citizens who joined ISIL, women convicted of extremism and ideological ties with such to groups as ISIL. Review of the official statistical data, national counter-terrorism strategies, programs, reports and initiatives to examine gender issues, including the role of women in promoting or prevention of violent extremism.	Gender in radicalisation and violent extremism and the role of women. The vulnerability of migrants in Russia and Turkey and the promotion of violent extremism using social media, targeting residents in the southern regions of the country, most from the Uzbek population.
Mohammed S Elshimi with Raffaello Pantucci, Sarah Lain and Nadine L Salman. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Search for Common Ground	Occasional Paper. Understanding the Factors Contributing to Radicalisation Among Central Asian Labour Migrants in Russia. 2018 https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/understanding-factors-contributing-radicalisation-among-central-asian	218 interviews of migrant workers in 7 Russian Federal districts from Kyrgyzstan (83), Uzbekistan (67), and Tajikistan (68).	The aim was to study/understand broader political, economic, social, institutional, and cultural conditions/factors that may, in certain circumstances, increase people's risk of vulnerability to the manifestations of violent extremism - perception of factors contributing to violent extremism (personal, structural motives, conducive environment, vulnerable groups, existing sources of resilience) According to the researchers, there were methodological limitations as direct access to violent extremists for practical and ethical reasons was not possible. As a result, the study was conducted among migrant workers who were in an environment where radicalisation occurred.

			From the Central Asians who migrated to work in Russia, a minimal number can be identified as ending up as foreign fighters in Syria or Iraq. Out of 2 million migrant workers in Russia, less than a few thousand of Central Asians went to combat zones.
UCA, UN in Kyrgyzstan	Policy Brief. Development of a Comprehensive Long-Term Evidence-Based Migration Policy for The Kyrgyz Republic. Migration and the 2030 Agenda. May 2019.	Review of primary and secondary laws and other sources on migration policy and the situation in the country.	Recommendations: - Build a national platform for dialogue (understanding aspects of migration, migrant needs, shared vision, holistic migration strategy); - Systemically collect migration data; - Conduct comprehensive studies on migration; - Consider the vulnerability of migrants; - Develop a flexible, human-rights based and gender-sensitive scheme/programme for migrant labour mobility; - Ensure full participation of migrant workers in the formal economy; - Develop gender-sensitive migration policies, considering social, cultural, environmental aspects; - mPromote sustainable integration of returning migrants, considering their needs; - mProvide legal aid for migrant workers; - mAnalyse existing migration policies and practices; - Conclude bilateral or regional agreements for social security (safe transfer of earned benefits for migrant workers).

Kloé Tricot O'Farrell and Jordan Street.	A Threat Inflected? The Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism Agenda in Kyrgyzstan, 2019 https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/a-threat-inflated-the-countering-and-preventing-violent-extremism-agenda-in-kyrgyzstan	Secondary legislation review, interviews with representatives of national and international organisations, donor and government agencies, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2018	A critical review of policies/initiatives to prevent violent extremism in Central Asia, which substantiates the inconclusiveness of existing diagnostic methods, evidence and threats of violent extremism in the region. The need to address key factors related to development, conflicts in Kyrgyzstan, in particular, social injustice, opaque and unrepresentative decision-making, isolation and marginalisation, sexual and gender-based violence.
International Crisis Group (ICG)	Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalisation https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b83-kyrgyzstan-state-fragility-and-radicalisation-russian.pdf	Interviews with elite experts	The report outlines the vulnerability of Kyrgyzstan's security and the need to prevent radicalisation and counter this growing threat, through strengthening the credibility of state institutions and tolerating non-violent Islamists. The report's conclusions on the scale and risks of Islamic mobilisation created narratives of danger. The two assumptions in the report reflect the underlying assumptions of narrative danger: religion is part of the problem, if there were political pluralism, a secure state and economic opportunities, people would be less religious; non-violent, 'non-traditional' groups are indicators of growth (or at least potential growth) of violent extremism.
Team of international experts on Central Asia	Debate on understanding Islamic radicalization in Central Asia. Open address by international researchers to the International Crisis Group		In an open letter, researchers state that ICG's report, Kyrgyzstan: State Fragility and Radicalization, as well as its previous publications on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan '... make misleading and methodologically weak conclusions about the extent and threats of Islamic mobilization. In the context of reactive policies, with a lack of real knowledge, risk narratives can lead to a number of erroneous assumptions, problems and solutions.' https://caa-network.org/archives/8258

John Heathershaw and David Montgomery	Report: The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics November. 2014. Chatham House. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. At https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/myth-post-soviet-muslim-radicalization-central-asian-republics#	Literature review. Discourse analysis. Data from a 2005 survey (a survey of 829 respondents) on religious and cultural practices conducted by Montgomery in the Osh and Naryn regions of Kyrgyzstan. Over 97 per cent of the 829 respondents self-identified as Muslims. See David W. Montgomery, The Transmission of Religious and Cultural Knowledge and Potentiality in Practice: An Anthropology of Social Navigation in the Kyrgyz Republic, Religious Studies, Boston University, 2007.	About Sharia: 'In particular, the results do not show that 51 per cent of Central Asian Muslims support Sharia - something that has no significant public support across the vast majority of the former Soviet region. Instead, these results may be better understood in terms of the state being seen to act immorally and its reform being framed in terms of religion as the source of moral authority.' p.14 The report challengers 'the portrayal of Islam and political Islam (including 'Islamization' and 'radicalization') in Central Asia in secular security discourse and Western and Central Asian policy analysis. These contentious terms are used and defined here as they are used and defined in the secular security discourses on the region so as to explore the discourses within their own terms.' p.3. These six claims (myths) 'are widely shared across national and international security discourse about Central Asian Islam. - There is a post-Soviet Islamic revival; - To Islamicize is to radicalize; - Authoritarianism and poverty cause radicalization; - Underground Muslim groups are radical; - Radical Muslim groups are globally networked; and - Political Islam opposes the secular state.'

A. Migration, gender, vulnerability			
Sharron A. FitzGerald	Biopolitics and the regulation of vulnerability: the case of the female trafficked migrant, International Journal of Law in Context, 2010, Vol. 6 (3), pp. 277–294. Vulnerable Bodies, Vulnerable Borders: Extraterritoriality and Human Trafficking, Feminist Legal Studies, 2012, Vol.20 (3), pp 227–244.	Case study of the UK	Analyses of a discourse 'around the concept of a vulnerable trafficked female migrant' as a biopolitical category, showing that the state's concern for the protection of vulnerable migrants is entangled with anti-immigration border protection and security agendas.
IOM, PIL	Fragile Power of Migration: the needs and rights of women and girls from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan who are affected by migration, IOM, 2018	Triangulation techniques: cabinet research, policy analysis, expert interviews, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, content analysis.	The report examines six different components of migration infrastructure and their impact on migration flows, mobility opportunities, and migrant women and girls' prospects of integration in the host community: - Regulatory (components) of infrastructure - Commercial (infrastructure components) - Technological (components) of infrastructure - Humanitarian (components) of infrastructure - Cultural (components) of infrastructure - Social (components) of infrastructure
PBSO, UNWomen, UNFPA, IOM, Министерство труда и социального развиятия КР	Women and Labour Migration	High-quality methods: 35 in-depth interviews, 18 case stages of families	The study shows the significant socio-economic inequality between rural and urban women and girls and the dominance of traditional gender norms. The report also notes that labour migration affects models of femininity and masculinity, as well as opportunities for women to resist and adapt to changing forms of patriarchy.

PIL, Mutkalim	Determining the level of knowledge of women and young people about radicalisation and violent extremism	Quantitative methods: interviews with 1,000 women in 10 pilot communities and structured interviews with 100 experts (representatives of the State Commission on Religious Affairs, local self-governance bodies, law enforcement, schools, health facilities, as well as local informal leaders, including imams).	There is a high level of contradictions in the systems of values among the population. On the one hand, there are external narratives about the dangers of violent extremism associated with Islam/religion, and on the other hand, there are internal religious values that normalise the processes of Islamisation in the country. In comparison with people in local communities, experts are more likely to give a negative prediction for the future, stating that extremist sentiments in their communities may increase.
B. Migration and Age			
Emil Nasritdinov, Zarina Urmanbetova, Kanatek Myrzakhalilov, Mametbek Myrzabaev	Vulnerability and resilience of young people in Kyrgyzstan to radicalization, violence and extremism, AUCA, 2019 https://auca.academia.edu/EmilNasritdinov/Papers	Literature review. Survey, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, individual stories	Analysis of five areas of youth' life: Sense of injustice, politics, religion, socialisation and psychology. 'The study did not reveal a direct relationship between young people's socioeconomic status and their vulnerability/resistance to radicalization. What makes young people more vulnerable is labour migration, which can contribute to radicalisation in both direct and indirect ways: some young people may gain more radical views from their own work experience migration in Russia, while other children become more vulnerable due to the absence of parents in labour migration ... Finally, regional and ethnic differences should be noted. The study shows that the southern regions in general, both the Batken region and the city of Osh in particular, are more vulnerable to radicalization than Naryn and northern regions. This confirms the statistics of the Kyrgyz special services. But the security services in Kyrgyzstan also claim that 90% of the radicals are ethnic Uzbeks from southern Kyrgyzstan.' p.3

Asis, M. M.	Living with migration: Experiences of left-behind children in the Philippines. 2006. Asian Population Studies.	Literature review. Comparative analysis - children of migrants and non-migrants; 1996 and 2003 surveys comparison, Philippines. The article is based on data collected in 2003 across the country (Children and Families survey -1443 children aged 10-12 years). The 2003 study was based on an earlier one from 1996 (Battistella and Conaco, 1996), which examined the link between the absence of parents and children's well-being. High-quality data were also collected through focus group discussions with teenagers.	Abandoned children who are perceived as most affected by the absence of fathers, mothers or both due to migration. The social costs of migration. Transnational families are not new to Filipino families since the 1970s men and women have been going abroad for work While migration places an emotional burden on migrants and their children, it also opens up opportunities for child subjects (agency) and independence. Three questions: (1) how children are brought up in the absence of one or both migrant parents; (2) how children adapt to changes in family, family practices; and (3) what role children play in how the family copes with the migration of one or both parents. 5 groups: children whose parents are not migrants, children with migrant parents: migrant mother, migrant father (sailors and land migrants), or both parents are migrants. Indicators: - Well-being: academic performance, physical health, cases/experiences of violence, and emotional health (loneliness scale, social anxiety, level of happiness); - Social and economic status (home, movable property, appliances and electrical appliances, perception of financial situation; - Values and spiritual education (education, religion, faith in God); - Household work

C. Migration and Family			
J. Mincer	Family Migration Decisions, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86 (5), 1978, pp. 749-773 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1828408		Gender relations and hierarchies within the household influence migration decisions. The family defines the role of women and girls in the incentives for migration and controls the distribution of resources and information that can support, discourage or prevent migration. At the same time, family decisions are mediated by existing gender-based international migration processes.
Mirca Madianou, Daniel Miller	Mobile Phone parenting: Reconfiguring relationships between Filipina migrant mothers and their left-behind children, 2011 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/anthropology/sites/anthropology/files/new_media_final_paper.pdf	Interview and observations of migrant women of different generations and their children who stayed at home in the Philippines	Assessing the impact of mobile phone contact on communication between migrant mothers and their children as uneven: on the one hand, mobile phone contact can increase intimacy and strengthen family relationships; on the other hand, the demands of intensive motherhood were increasing, since caring for the family was the responsibility of women.

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